Safety - Sweden

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PRB monitoring

  • In 2025, LFV NUAC achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for four out of five components. LFV NUAC missed the planned level in the Safety Risk Management component of the EoSM.

  • In 2025, ACR achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for four out of five components. ACR missed the planned level in the Safety Risk Management component of the EoSM.

  • In 2025, AFAB did not achieve their planned maturity levels in four out of five components of the EoSM. AFAB reached the planned level only in the component of Safety Policy and Objectives.

  • In 2025, SDATS did not achieve the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for three out of five components. SDATS missed the planned level in the Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance and Safety Promotion components of the EoSM.

  • The rate of runway incursions (RI) was 3.47 at airport level, higher than the Union-wide average, and lower than the rate of RIs in 2024. The rate of RIs with ANS contribution was 0.50, lower than the Union-wide average, and stable compared to 2024.

  • The rate of separation minima infringements (SMI) was 2.26 at State level and equal to the SMIs at ANSP level, with both indicators below the Union-wide average. When comparing to 2024, the rate of SMIs has decreased slightly at State level and increased at ANSP level.

Effectiveness of Safety Management (EoSM) (KPI#1)

LFV

In 2025, LFV NUAC achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for four out of five components. LFV NUAC missed the planned level in the Safety Risk Management component of the EoSM.

According to the monitoring report, Sweden notes that from Swedish experience the evaluation form via the EoSM reporting is a new form with slightly different criteria and evaluation forms. Sweden notes that LFV still has high focus on safety targets, but the new form gives different values in the table above even though the actual work has not differed. LFV has been on target in each area for several years and there are no indications through audits, reviews etc. that they do not fulfil the achieved levels.

In terms of main measures put in place to achieve the planned levels, the monitoring report defines the following elements:

  • Well known SMS. Training in SMS. Yearly review of SMS.

  • Regular review of hazards and risks and associated processes.

  • A system for investigation and follow up of results. Internal audits. Follow up on targets.

  • Refresher training and well established forms of communication.

  • A reporting system and follow up (also investigative) that gives feedback to the reporter.

ACR

In 2025, ACR achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for four out of five components. ACR missed the planned level in the Safety Risk Management component of the EoSM.

In terms of main measures put in place to achieve the planned levels, the monitoring report defines the following elements:

  • Established and well-known SMS. Training in SMS. Procedures for improvement of SMS.

  • Risk and hazards are identified in change processes. Assessment of level of risk acceptable. New and updated processes for monitoring and evaluation of risks and hazards.

  • System for handling of occurrence reports. Exchange with others for best practices. Internal audits.

  • Refresher training. Monthly reports.

  • Good reporting culture. Reports are disseminated. Safety culture surveys.

AFAB

AFAB did not achieve their planned maturity level in four out of five components of the EoSM. AFAB reached the planned level only in the component of Safety Policy and Objectives.

Sweden notes in the monitoring report that AFAB has not reached all target levels. Evaluation is conducted via the EoSM-report, and the Swedish Transport Agency performed an extra audit during 2025 due to concerns regarding the safety culture. The company no longer preforms ATS. ACR is the ATSP in action from first of April 2026. In addition, AFAB has improved their safety risk management by reviewing risks annually, comparing risks against tolerability criteria, and training staff on how to reduce risk. AFAB has been working throughout the year to fill all vacancies in management. AFAB also works to improve in all areas based on recommendations from a safety culture audit.

In terms of main measures put in place to achieve the planned levels, the monitoring report defines the following elements:

  • Well known SMS and policy. Yearly review of SMS. Management has safety on the agenda at meetings.

  • Yearly review of risks and hazards. Training in risk reduction. New staff.

  • Audit plan. Safety analysis twice a year. Trends are followed up.

  • Training of staff, both internal and external. Follow up by safety survey. New staff.

  • Feedback on reports. Take result from safety analysis into account for refresher training.

SDATS

In 2025, SDATS achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for two out of five components. SDATS missed the planned level in the Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance and Safety Promotion components of the EoSM.

In terms of main measures put in place to achieve the planned levels, the monitoring report defines the following elements:

  • Well-established policy: An approach to disseminating the throughout the organization. Safety performance monitoring: Continuous tracking of safety metrics and outcomes.

  • Well established hazard logs. Monitoring function. Safety action group.

  • Internal audits. Safety review board. Monitoring function.

  • Awareness training. Well disseminated chain of information.

  • Reporting culture. Exchange of information with others.

Safety occurrences

Rate of runway incursions (RIs) (PI#1) and Rate of runway incursion with ANS contribution (PI#3)

Rate of RIs per 100,000 airport movements - Sweden
# Airport name APT movements Number of RI Rate RI per 100,000 Number of RI with ANS contribution Rate RI per 100,000 with ANS contribution
1 Stockholm - Arlanda 201,709 7 3.47 1 0.50

In 2025, Sweden reported 7 runway incursions (RI) at Stockholm Arlanda airport. When comparing the RIs at airport level to Union-wide level, Sweden was higher than Union-wide average (3.47 vs 2.70). The rate of runway incursions has decreased compared to 2024 at airport level (3.47 vs 10.7).

In 2025, Sweden reported 1 runway incursion with ANS contribution. When comparing the rate of RIs at airport level with ANS contribution, Sweden was lower than Union-wide average (0.50 vs 0.87). The rate of RIs with ANS contribution has remained stable compared to 2024 (0.50 vs 0.52).

In terms of the initiatives implemented or planned to improve this performance indicator, according to the report, there are four main initiatives in this regard listed below. The authority is referred to as an NCA. In Sweden NSA and NCA both are organized in the Swedish Transport Agency. In cooperation with the Air Navigation Services section, the NCA organises an annual seminar during which, inter alia, statistics and trends from the previous year are presented, with Runway Incursions constituting a standing and prioritised agenda item. As a large proportion of the country’s airport operators attend the seminar, the discussions and exchange of experiences become more general in nature, thereby contributing to broad national learning rather than focusing on a single airport. Naturally, the undersigned does not stand on stage discussing Arlanda specifically in front of all other airport operators. The NCA regularly informs airport operators of critical safety-related information and recommendations issued by EASA. A recent and very relevant example is SIB 2025-07 (Continuous use of stop bars). The SIB concerns the strong recommendation that stop bars — historically often used only during LVP (Low Visibility Procedures) — should also be used during normal day-to-day operations in good weather conditions as a physical and visual barrier. Based on actual occurrences and incident investigations, it can clearly be observed that such procedures have the potential to prevent runway incursions from occurring altogether.

Furthermore, as described in the monitoring report, runway incursions constitute a continuous focus area within the NCA’s oversight activities. Prior to an oversight inspection, the NCA collects and analyses specific data from ECCAIRS2 relating to the entity subject to oversight. Unlike the broader seminar format, the audit questions in this context are tailored directly to the local occurrences that have taken place. The NCA verifies how the operator has managed the occurrences, whether local trends have been identified (for example, if a specific taxiway or intersection is overrepresented due to difficult or ambiguous infrastructure/signage), and which mitigating measures have been implemented. It should be noted that, in such cases, the NCA examines the responsibilities of the airport operator, whereas occurrences involving direct ATM contribution are handled by inspectors within the Air Navigation Services section (ANS/SLif). The NCA receives weekly ECCAIRS2 reports by email concerning the airports for which the respective inspector serves as focal point. This enables the establishment of direct contact with the airport operator and allows the NCA to request corrective actions depending on the extent and nature of the occurrences.

Rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) (PI#2) and Rate of separation minima infringements with ANS contribution (PI#4)

Rate of SMI with ANS contribution per 100,000 flight hours
# ANSP
Flight hours
Number of SMIs with ANS contribution
Rate of SMI with ANS contribution per 100,000 flight hours
% variation in rate of SMIs
2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
1 LFV NUAC 354,007 NA NA NA NA 7 NA NA NA NA 2.0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 ACR NA NA NA NA NA 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 AFAB NA NA NA NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
4 LFV NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
5 SDATS NA NA NA NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

At State level, Sweden reported 8 separation minima infringements (SMI) in their airspace during 2025. The rate of separation minima infringements was lower than Union-wide average (2.26 vs 7.87). At ANSP level, Sweden reported 8 SMIs with ANS contribution. The rate of separation minima infringements at ANSP level was lower than the Union-wide average (2.26 vs 6.02).

When comparing to 2024, the rate of separation minima infringements has decreased at State level (2.26 vs 2.52) and increased at ANSP level (2.26 vs 1.4).

According to the monitoring report, NCA is continuously monitoring the number of SMI’s and does also follow up on relevant actions taken with reference to the ANSP investigation report for the SMI. Sweden notes that there was data only available for LFV at this submission.

Furthermore, Sweden notes that the number of controlled flight hours is only available for LFV as reported previous years at the time of this reporting. The reporting corresponds to ACE data, ACCs and APPs. For other purposes and reporting these values, controlled hours of SDATS, ACR and AFAB, have been estimated to the best possible extent. Values can, probably, be extracted from the relevant systems but unfortunately not in time of this deadline.