Safety - Spain

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PRB monitoring

  • In 2025, ENAIRE achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM. In more detail, ENAIRE exceeded the planned levels in all areas, reaching the highest level D in all components.

  • In 2025, EA met the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM. In more detail, EA exceeded the planned level in the area of Safety Risk Management, reaching level D together with Safety Culture component.

  • In 2025, Skyway met the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for four out of five components of the EoSM. In more detail, the area where Skyway missed the planned level was Safety Policy and Objectives.

  • The rate of runway incursions (RI) was 2.14 at airport level, lower than the Union-wide average, and lower than the rate of RIs in 2024. The rate of RIs with ANS contribution was 0.50, lower than the Union-wide average, and lower than the rate of RIs with ANS contribution in 2024.

  • The rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) at State level was 4.26, and at ANSP level 6.67. Rate of SMIs at State level was below the Union-wide average, whereas at ANSP level the rate was above the Union-wide average. When comparing to 2024, rate of SMIs has decreased at both State level and at ANSP level.

Effectiveness of Safety Management (EoSM) (KPI#1)

ENAIRE

In 2025, ENAIRE achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM. In more detail, ENAIRE exceeded the planned levels in all areas, reaching the highest level D in all components.

In terms of main measures put in place to achieve the safety performance targets, the report defines the following elements:

  • Well-established SMS processes and continuously improving since 2009.

  • The systematic integration of human factors across all safety areas.

  • The development of increasingly powerful and robust dashboards to support more effective safety monitoring facilitating informed decision‑making.

  • Consistent and proactive involvement in international working groups focused on safety improvement.

  • Commitment to benchmarking and the exchange of best practices.

EA

In 2025, EA met the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM. In more detail, EA exceeded the planned level in the area of Safety Risk Management, reaching level D together alongside Safety Culture component.

According to the monitoring report, some differences should be noted in the fields (c) and (d) due to the military condition of the EA and the comprehensive approach to safety of the EA that under Flight Safety includes all the Operational Safety aspects of all the activities done by the EA, some of then the not easily releasable to the public.

Skyway

Skyway met the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for four out of five components of the EoSM. In more detail, the area where Skyway missed the planned level was Safety Policy and Objectives.

In terms of main measures put in place to achieve the planned levels, the report lists Definition of Skyway's Safety Culture. Just Culture fora for debate among employees and management. Human Factors training itinerary.

For the maturity levels where Skyway did not reach the planned level, the monitoring report lists the following circumstances that lead to this situation: Actual values for the new questions 3.1 and 5.1 are lower than expected due to the inclusion of specific Human Factors capability requirements. The coordination carried out by AESA (Civil Spanish NSA) with EASA to ensure future compliance is particularly noteworthy. The current gap is mainly related to the formal recognition of the EUROCONTROL Practitioner LZ – Human Factors Practitioner Programme [HUM-PRG-PP] qualification within the EoSM framework. Following coordination with EASA, it has been clarified that this qualification may be considered acceptable in place of the HF Specialist/Expert accreditation required under the EoSM, provided that the staff member has fully completed the programme and has officially obtained the certification, rather than being only in the process of training. Until the certification is formally achieved by the relevant personnel, the organisation cannot demonstrate Level C compliance for questions 3.1 and Level D for 5.1. Nevertheless, the transition period foreseen within RP4 and the ongoing coordination with EASA provide a clear path towards full compliance in the coming years.

Safety occurrences

Rate of runway incursions (RIs) (PI#1) and Rate of runway incursion with ANS contribution (PI#3)

Rate of RIs per 100,000 airport movements - Spain
# Airport name APT movements Number of RI Rate RI per 100,000 Number of RI with ANS contribution Rate RI per 100,000 with ANS contribution
1 Madrid Barajas 430,785 12 2.79 1 0.23
2 Barcelona 360,873 4 1.11 4 1.11
3 Palma de Mallorca 246,755 5 2.03 1 0.41
4 Malaga 188,919 4 2.12 0 0.00
5 Gran Canaria 147,075 8 5.44 2 1.36
6 Alicante 126,081 0 0.00 0 0.00
7 Ibiza 85,086 1 1.18 0 0.00

In 2025, Spain reported 8 runway incursions (RI) at all the airports listed in the performance plan (7). When comparing the RIs at airport level to Union-wide level, Spain was lower than Union-wide average (0.50 vs 2.70). The rate of runway incursions has decreased significantly compared to 2024 at airport level (0.50 vs 11.91).

In 2025, Spain reported 8 runway incursions with ANS contribution. When comparing the rate of RIs at airport level with ANS contribution, Spain was lower than Union-wide average (0.50 vs 0.87). The rate of RIs with ANS contribution has decreased compared to 2024 (0.50 vs 1.43).

In terms of the initiatives implemented or planned to improve this performance indicator, the report defines the following elements for ENAIRE: An A-SMGCS level 2 System has been reactivated in LEPA in early 2026 (out of service due to technical issues throughout 2025). In addition, a runway incursion alerts system has also been implemented in LEMG in early 2026. The implementation of a system for Non-Conformity Alerts and Conflicting Authorisations (CMAC / CATC) is planned for 2026. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the implementation of measures in the different action plans activated in previous years is monitored, especially a specific Action Plan at the Barcelona-El Prat Tower (February 2025).

For SKYWAY, the monitoring report defines as follows: Skyway included in the 2025 Safety Plans of every unit the analysis and implementation of the new GAPPRI recommendations published in August 2024, when applicable.

In terms of monitoring the effectiveness of the initiatives, the NSA states in the monitoring report that the monitoring of the proposed measures is structured at three levels. Firstly, through the application within AESA of the Risk-Based Oversight (RBO) methodology, where the evolution of the indicators is monitored. Moreover, several key safety areas are identified at a State Level (through the State Safety Program) to categorize occurrences. These key safety areas include, for the ATM/ANS scope runway incursions. In the case of Runway Incursions, these are defined as occurrences where an aircraft, vehicle or person is improperly within the protected areas designated for landing and take-off of aircraft. Secondly, the monitoring continues through the follow-up of the effective implementation of measures via ATM/ANS audits (related functional changes, specific action plans). Finally, regular meetings are held with the ANSP Accountable Manager and the Safety Manager, during which updates are provided on the evolution of the indicators, as well as on the underlying causes and the measures implemented.

Rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) (PI#2) and Rate of separation minima infringements with ANS contribution (PI#4)

Rate of SMI with ANS contribution per 100,000 flight hours
# ANSP
Flight hours
Number of SMIs with ANS contribution
Rate of SMI with ANS contribution per 100,000 flight hours
% variation in rate of SMIs
2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
1 ENAIRE 1,941,651 NA NA NA NA 133 NA NA NA NA 6.8 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 SKYWAY 52,792 NA NA NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA 0.0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 EA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

At State level, Spain reported 85 separation minima infringements (SMI) in their airspace during 2025. The rate of separation minima infringements was lower than Union-wide average (4.26 vs 7.87). At ANSP level, Spain reported 133 SMIs with ANS contribution. The rate of separation minima infringements at ANSP level was higher than the Union-wide average (6.67 vs 6.02).

When comparing to 2024, the rate of separation minima infringements has decreased significantly at State level (4.26 vs 29.13) and decreased at ANSP level (6.67 vs 8.57).

In terms of the initiatives implemented or planned to improve this performance indicator, at State level, Spain describes that the monitoring of the proposed measures is structured at three levels. Firstly, through the application within AESA of the Risk-Based Oversight (RBO) methodology, where the evolution of the indicators is monitored. Moreover, several key safety areas are identified at a State Level (through the State Safety Program) to categorize occurrences. These key safety areas include, for the ATM/ANS scope, loss of separation in flight. In the case of loss of separation in flight, this key safety area includes occurrences where:

  • The separation minima between two aircraft are breached.

  • In which two aircraft fail to maintain the separation prescribed for the current airspace and flight rules.

  • And where there is an inadequate separation, meaning situations in which the separation, perceived by either the pilots or the ATS personnel, is compromised even where no minima was prescribed (for example, between aircraft in uncontrolled airspace, or between VFR and IFR aircraft in class E airspace).

Secondly, the monitoring continues through the follow-up of the effective implementation of measures via ATM/ANS audits (related functional changes, specific action plans). Finally, regular meetings are held with the ANSP Accountable Manager and the Safety Manager, during which updates are provided on the evolution of the indicators, as well as on the underlying causes and the measures implemented.

In terms of the initiatives implemented or planned to improve this performance indicator, at ANSP level, the monitoring report defines the following elements: For ENAIRE, a TTM (Tactical Trajectory Module) tool with medium-term conflict warnings and a “what-else” function, for blind spot event prevention, has been implemented in 2025, in LECM and LECB Enroute sectors, and its implementation at LECS and GCCC is planned for the near future. Also, a STCA (Short Term Conflict Alert) alert system has been implemented in 2025 at GCXO Approach. Airspace restructuring has also been carried out at LECP in 2025. Improvements in civil-military coordination in the Torrejón area (LEMD-LETO) are also planned for 2026.
On the other hand, the effectiveness of the implementation of measures in the different action plans activated in previous years is monitored, especially a specific Action Plan in LECM-Enroute (May 2024), and an Action Plan for speed adherence in the final approach to LEPA (July 2023).
The monitoring report also notes that the reported data is provided RAT ground severity associated to the SMI, as obtained by the application of the RAT methodology by the ANSP.

Furthermore, the number of SMIs reported by ENAIRE is 133, corresponding to the total number of safety incidents classified as minimum separation infringements recorded in ENAIRE'S database, which have been assigned a ground severity of A, B or C after applying the RAT, as indicated in the guidance material referenced in the PRB template itself.

For EA, the monitoring report states that this PI is new for the EA and doesn’t reflect exactly the statistics EA is keeping. EA states it will need more time to accommodate their data to this new indicator.