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Safety - Poland

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PRB monitoring

  • In 2025, PANSA achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM.

  • In 2025, Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A. met the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM.

  • In 2025, Warmia i Mazury Sp. z o.o. met the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM. In Safety Promotion, the organisation exceeded their planned level.

  • The rate of runway incursions (RI) was 1.70 and equal to the RIs with ANS contribution, with the former indicator below the Union-wide average while the latter above. The rate of RIs has decreased compared to 2024 at both levels.

  • The rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) at State level was 2.09, and equal to the rate of SMIs at ANSP level. Both indicators were below the Union-wide average and both indicators have decreased significantly compared to 2024.

Effectiveness of Safety Management (EoSM) (KPI#1)

NoteFocus on EoSM

PANSA

In 2025, PANSA achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM.

According to the monitoring report, PANSA achieved all targets set for that year. At the end of 2025 the actual safety performance was in line with the established targets. Evidence supporting the EoSM maturity levels declared by PANSA in each component was provided to the NSA. Moreover, the NSA conducted an in-depth analysis of the responses provided, as well as the supporting evidence. During this assessment, additional questions arose, and PANSA was requested to provide further explanations. Representatives of the NSA and PANSA held a meeting during which all identified issues and additional arguments related to the introduced changes were discussed. Following the receipt of additional explanations and the discussions held during the meeting, the NSA accepted the responses provided and the maturity levels declared by PANSA.

In terms of main measures put in place to achieve the safety performance targets, the report defines the following elements:

  • The "PANSA Safety Culture" document was prepared in 2025 and approved by the Safety Manager. It is accompanied by the "Safety Culture Assessment Programme" based on the blocks and target audience defined in the document. The Assessment Programme was approved by the Safety Manager and market research started for the purpose of obtaining a contractor for the assessment.

  • Various meetings in local ATS units, including “Safety Days”, were continued in 2025 to popularise PANSA’s Safety Vision, promote Just Culture, including Reporting Culture and discuss local safety issues.

  • Local Safety Experts have become key experts in risk assessment.

  • PANSA has updated the training programme for all personnel which covers Safety Management matters. Dedicated training has been developed for the top management in a classroom form. SMS training for the operational personnel is part of the operational training. Other PANSA personnel are provided with mandatory e-learning.

  • The integrated Hazard Register was ramped-up under the control of the dedicated unit for hazard identification and SMS development.

  • All SMS procedures have been reviewed and updated, and new Just Culture Policy was agreed with all trade unions, signed and published.

  • A rolling programme of verifying working time based on rostering was continued (planned and executed) for all units (3 subsequent operational units at once on a quarterly basis). The reports were provided to the Director of Operations for on-going corrections.

  • Co-operation was established with other ANSPs and information exchanged on practices in safety performance and procedures.

  • PANSA joined the Data4Safety programme of EASA.

  • PANSA joined the CANSO/EUROCONTROL safety benchmarking programme Standard of Excellence in SMS.

  • Initiation of integration of change management with safety assessment processes within the safety management department.

  • Training and implementing the Kanban method using MS Teams to oversee air traffic occurrence investigations.

The Polish NSA notes in the monitoring report that certain initiatives still need to be undertaken and implemented in order to allow achievement of the targets set for PANSA for the upcoming years of RP4. These include:

  • Dedicated Human Factor expert(s) to be employed to provide support across PANSA. Actions are planned to be taken to acquire a contract expert (Safety Risk Management – Level D – 2029).

  • Fatigue Risk Management procedure to be revised and adapted to improve the management of fatigue-related risk based on internally and externally collected data (Safety Risk Management – Level D – 2029). HR data research started in 2025.

  • Safety Dashboard shall be ready in 2026 and is intended to be the tool to identify and present operational risk for acceptance by the operational managers. The current operational risk identification is limited to sector overload (Safety Risk Management – Level D – 2029).

  • Formalisation of current practices to analyse trends arising from SMS audits and surveys (Safety Assurance – Level C – 2026).

Furthermore, as per the monitoring report, the NSA will closely monitor the implementation of measures aimed at improving the effectiveness of safety management, including through ongoing monitoring activities, as well as planned and unplanned inspections carried out as part of the continuous oversight of the ANSP.

Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A.

In 2025, Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A. met the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM.

The NSA notes in the monitoring report, that as this was the first year of completing the new version of the questionnaire, the process proved to be significantly more time- and resource-consuming, and the assessment of Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A. declared maturity levels required increased engagement from both the ANSP and the CAA.

In terms of main measures put in place to achieve the safety performance levels, the report defines that the ANSP introduced changes to internal procedures related to Safety Management System, including an expansion on the scope of its internal assessments.

According to the monitoring report, based on the results of the 2025 questionnaire assessment, the CAA considers that in order to achieve the target RP4 safety levels Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A. will need to implement additional measures related to safety requirements. In the coming years the organisation is expected to further strengthen internal governance and management involvement in safety, in particular by ensuring that board-level management is systematically informed about key operational and organisational risks, safety hotspots, ongoing safety initiatives and safety culture assessments outcomes. Continued improvement is required in the formalisation and effective implementation of hazard identification processes, ensuring they adequately address both current operations and changes, and are supported by an appropriate balance of reactive, proactive and predictive safety data. Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A. should also focus on enhancing safety culture assessment processes and implementing robust actions to address identified gaps. Further efforts are needed to reinforce Just Culture principles and encourage staff involvement in developing solutions related to Just Culture. In addition, improvements are expected in supporting areas such as change management, emergency preparedness, and targeted safety communication. Overall, ANSPs should aim to ensure greater consistency, integration and effectiveness across all SMS elements, with a focus on continuous improvement.

Furthermore, the NSA will closely monitor the implementation of measures aimed at improving the effectiveness of safety management, including through ongoing monitoring activities and planned and unplanned inspections carried out as part of the continuous oversight of the ANSP.

Warmia i Mazury Sp. z o.o.

In 2025, Warmia i Mazury Sp. z o.o. met the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM. In Safety Promotion, the organisation exceeded their planned level.

In terms of main measures put in place to achieve the planned safety performance levels, Warmia i Mazury Sp. z o.o. introduced and executed a comprehensive suite of initiatives designed to uphold the safety targets specified in the preceding year's questionnaire. Key actions included aligning all SMS-related procedures, requirements, and documentation with national and international legal frameworks. Continuous SMS training was delivered to both internal staff and external contractors. Furthermore, operational oversight was strengthened through the active roles of the Safety Manager, Safety Committee, and Safety Review Board, complemented by routine Local Safety Meetings and the refinement of key safety performance indicators. To foster a proactive organisational culture, the airport conducted systematic internal SMS audits, regular safety surveys, and integrated safety-specific investments into its annual business planning while actively exchanging best practices. Notably, in accordance with the latest regulatory frameworks, the airport has implemented an Information Security Management System (ISMS) compliant with Part-IS requirements.

To demonstrate the continuous maturity of Level C within safety risk management, the monitoring report notes that the following evidence-backed processes were confirmed:

  • A comprehensive review of the SMS framework is conducted at least annually.

  • Risk management processes utilise a combination of reactive, proactive, and predictive methods.

In terms of reaching the targets in future years of the reference period, according to the report, based on the results of the 2025 questionnaire assessment, the CAA considers that in order to achieve the target RP4 safety levels Warmia i Mazury Sp. z o.o. will need to implement additional measures related to safety requirements. In the coming years the ANSP is expected to further strengthen internal governance arrangements and ensure that board-level management is systematically informed about key operational and organisational risks, safety hotspots, safety initiatives and safety culture outcomes. A stronger and more consistent top-down commitment from senior and middle management is required to actively promote and sustain a positive safety culture, supported by clear communication, visible leadership engagement and structured organisational messaging. Further development is also expected in the integration of human performance principles into day-to-day operations, including the adoption and effective use of recognised good practices and the active involvement of Human Factors expertise across relevant organisational areas. In addition, the organisation should continue to mature its safety culture process, including regular and structured safety culture assessments, the implementation and tracking of improvement actions, and effective monitoring of their outcomes. Overall, the ANSP is expected to ensure greater consistency, integration and effectiveness across all SMS and safety culture elements, with a clear focus on continuous improvement and operational resilience.

According to the report, the NSA will closely monitor the implementation of the measures aimed at improving the effectiveness of safety management, including through ongoing monitoring activities, as well as planned and unplanned inspections carried out as part of the continuous oversight of the ANSP.

Safety occurrences

Rate of runway incursions (RIs) (PI#1) and Rate of runway incursion with ANS contribution (PI#3)

Rate of RIs per 100,000 airport movements - Poland
# Airport name APT movements Number of RI Rate RI per 100,000 Number of RI with ANS contribution Rate RI per 100,000 with ANS contribution
1 Lotnisko Chopina w Warszawie 201,341 5 2.48 5 2.48
2 Kraków-Balice 91,359 2 2.19 2 2.19
3 Gdańsk im. Lecha Wałęsy 62,230 0 0.00 0 0.00
4 Katowice-Pyrzowice 50,395 0 0.00 0 0.00
5 Poznań-Ławica 46,775 1 2.14 1 2.14
6 Wrocław-Strachowice 40,219 0 0.00 0 0.00
7 Warszawa/Modlin 21,354 0 0.00 0 0.00
8 Rzeszów-Jasionka 18,760 0 0.00 0 0.00
9 Łódź 17,024 1 5.87 1 5.87
10 Bydgoszcz 15,109 1 6.62 1 6.62
11 Szczecin-Goleniów 8,635 0 0.00 0 0.00
12 Lublin 5,391 0 0.00 0 0.00
13 Lotnisko Warszawa-Radom 4,769 0 0.00 0 0.00
14 Olsztyn-Mazury 2,429 0 0.00 0 0.00
15 Zielona Góra-Babimost 1,651 0 0.00 0 0.00
NoteFocus on runway incursions

Poland has reported 10 runway incursions (RI) during 2025 for all airports listed in the performance plans (15). In terms of ANS contribution, Poland reported 10 runway incursions.

When comparing the rate of RIs at airport level to Union-wide level, Poland was lower than Union-wide average (1.70 vs 2.70). The rate has decreased significantly compared to 2024 (1.70 vs 7.13).

When comparing the rate of RIs at airport level with ANS contribution, Poland was higher than Union-wide average (1.70 vs 0.87). The rate has decreased significantly compared to 2024 (1.70 vs 7.13).

According to the monitoring report, the CAA addresses the reduction of runway incursions through the National Aviation Safety Plan 2026–2028 (Area A.5 – Runway Incursion). Key initiatives implemented and planned include:

  • Establishment by the CAA President of the internal CAA National Runway Safety Team aimed at enhancing the exchange of information between the CAA and aerodrome operators in the field of runway safety. The Team meets on a regular annual basis (with additional ad hoc meetings convened when necessary), and representatives of other aviation industry stakeholders may also be invited to participate in the meetings, where appropriate. Information from the meetings is published on the CAA website.

  • Organising yearly meetings with aerodrome operators to discuss the entire spectrum of aerodrome oversight most vital issues.

  • Supporting development and implementation of Local Runway Safety Plans by aerodrome operators.

  • Promoting safety awareness through Local Safety Days and the dissemination of Safety Lessons derived from occurrence investigations.

  • Strengthened oversight of aerodrome operators’ Safety Management Systems (SMS), with particular focus on ground movement safety and preventive barriers, including dissemination of safety information (e.g. EASA SIB) to aerodrome operators for implementation, publication of such information on the Authority’s website, and verification of related recommendations during ongoing oversight activities; particular attention is also given to the assessment of detailed information concerning RI reporting, including verification of reports submitted by aerodrome operators and ATS providers, in order to ensure comprehensive occurrence reporting and effective exchange of information between the involved parties.

Furthermore, The CAA monitors the SPI (number of runway incursions as well as taxiway and apron incursions, per 10,000 operations) on a continuous basis using data from the ECCAIRS2 system and mandatory reporting by aerodrome operators. Effectiveness is assessed through trend analysis, the severity of occurrences, the percentage of events with ANS contribution, and the implementation rate of safety recommendations. Where negative trends are observed, the CAA applies additional supervisory measures, including enhanced audits and targeted corrective action plans.

Rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) (PI#2) and Rate of separation minima infringements with ANS contribution (PI#4)

Rate of SMI with ANS contribution per 100,000 flight hours
# ANSP
Flight hours
Number of SMIs with ANS contribution
Rate of SMI with ANS contribution per 100,000 flight hours
% variation in rate of SMIs
2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
1 PANSA 430,614 NA NA NA NA 9 NA NA NA NA 2.1 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A. 0 NA NA NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 Warmia i Mazury sp. z o.o. 0 NA NA NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NoteFocus on separation minima

At State level, Poland reported 9 separation minima infringements (SMI) in their airspace
during 2025. The rate of separation minima infringements was lower than the Union-wide average (2.09 vs 7.87). At ANSP level, Poland reported 9 SMIs with ANS contribution. The rate of separation minima infringements at ANSP level was lower than the Union-wide average (2.09 vs 6.02).

When comparing to 2024, the rate of separation minima infringements has decreased significantly at both State level (2.09 vs 14.08) and ANSP level (2.09 vs 14.68).

According to the monitoring report, PANSA's measures to improve the SMI PI include regular occurrence investigations accompanied by recommendations, local Safety Days, during which incidents are discussed, as well as Safety Lessons which enable lessons learned from investigated occurrences to be shared with all operational staff, including ATCO training. Furthermore, in accordance with the National Aviation Safety Plan 2026–2028 (Area A.3 – Mid-Air Collision – MAC which includes Level busts, Separation Minima Infringements and Airspace Infringements), the NSA is implementing a number of measures to enhance the Separation Minima Infringements (SMI) indicator at the Member State level. Key initiatives include:

  • Systematic investigation of occurrences, followed by the issuance of safety recommendations to PANSA and other stakeholders.

  • Support for PANSA’s Local Safety Days and Safety Lessons programme, with an emphasis on sharing lessons learned with operational staff and ATCOs.

  • Enhanced oversight of PANSA’s Safety Management System (SMS), focusing on separation management processes and human factors.

  • Promotion of targeted training programmes for air traffic controllers in conflict detection and resolution.

In addition, as described in the monitoring report, the NSA continuously monitors the SMI SPI through the national occurrence database (ECCAIRS2) and quarterly reports submitted by PANSA. The effectiveness of these measures is evaluated based on indicator trends, the number and severity of separation-related events, the implementation rate of safety recommendations, and the outcomes of regular SMS audits. The results are reviewed annually within the framework of reporting on the National Safety Plan.

 
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