PERFORMANCE REVIEW BOARD
of the Single European Sky

Performance Review Board Monitoring Report Netherlands - 2025

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Contents

1 OVERVIEW

1.1 Contextual information

This document is based on the version of the Annual Monitoring Report file submitted by FABEC on 2026-07-15 (`XF12503_FABEC AMR 2025 V1.1.xlsx`) and the accompanying submission of en route and terminal (if applicable) reporting tables.

FAB draft revised performance plan currently under assessment

List of ACCs 1
Amsterdam ACC

No of airports in the scope of the performance plan:
- **≥80'K** 1
- **<80'K** 3

Exchange rate (1 EUR=)
2022: 1 EUR
2025: 1 EUR

Share of Union-wide:
- **traffic (TSUs) 2025** 2.1%
- **en route costs 2025** 4.3%

Share en route / terminal costs 2025 77% / 23%

En route charging zone(s)
Netherlands

Terminal charging zone(s)
Netherlands

Main ANSP
- LVNL

Other ANSPs
- MUAC

MET Providers
- Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI)

1.2 Traffic (En route traffic zone)



- The Netherlands recorded 1,239K actual IFR movements in 2025, -1.2% compared to 2024 (1,254K).
- Actual 2025 IFR movements were -3.7% below the plan (1,286K).
- Actual 2025 IFR movements were -6.9% below the actual 2019 level (1,332K).



- The Netherlands recorded 2,907K actual service units in 2025, -3.5% compared to 2024 (3,013K).
- Actual 2025 service units were -5.3% below the plan (3,071K).
- Actual 2025 service units are -14.0% below the actual 2019 level (3,381K).

1.3 Safety (Main ANSP)

- In 2025, LVNL achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for three out of five components of the EoSM. The components where LVNL missed the planned levels were Safety Policy and Objectives and Safety Promotion.
- The rate of runway incursions (RI) was 6.41 at airport level, higher than the Union-wide average. The rate of RIs with ANS contribution was 1.60, higher than the Union-wide average. In 2024, the Netherlands reported 0 runway incursions.
- The rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) at State level was 13.42, and at ANSP level 15.17. Both indicators were significantly above the Union-wide average. At ANSP level, rate of SMIs has decreased compared to 2024.

1.4 Environment (Member State)



- Netherlands registered a KEA performance of 2.84% compared to its local breakdown value of 2.92%. Whilst the local target for FABEC was not achieved, the Netherlands contributed positively towards Union-wide performance.
- KEP and KES remained stable in comparison with 2024.
- VFE of the actual trajectory was at 78.5%, which was better than the Union-wide average.
- The average time in level flight during descent improved marginally and during climb remained stable compared to 2024.
- Additional taxi-out time was 3.25 min/flight which improved marginally compared to 2024, and additional taxi-in time was 1.87 min/flight which improved compared to 2.17 min/flight in 2024.
- Additional time in the arrival sequencing and metering area improved marginally from 2.67 min/flight to 2.59 min/flight in 2025.

1.5 Capacity (Member State)





- Netherlands registered 0.13 minutes of average en route ATFM delay per flight during 2025, which has been adjusted to 0.14 during the post-ops adjustment process, thus achieving the local target value of 0.16. Delays in Netherlands increased by 0.06 minutes per flight year-on-year.
- Delays were highest in June, August and September, mostly driven by other non-ATC causes but with notable contributions from weather and ATC capacity.
- The share of delayed flights with delays longer than 15 minutes in Netherlands increased by 6 percentage points compared to 2024 but was lower than 2019 values.
- The number of ATCOs in OPS was 79 FTEs in Amsterdam ACC, being below the 2025 plan by -2 FTEs.
- The yearly total of sector opening hours in Amsterdam ACC was 39,701, showing a -1% decrease compared to 2024.
- Amsterdam ACC registered 14.00 IFR movements per sector opening hour in 2025, 1% above the level recorded in 2024.
- Netherlands registered an average airport arrival ATFM delay of 4.44 minutes per flight in 2025, thus not achieving the local target of 2.2 minutes. Compared to 2024, average arrival ATFM delays in Netherlands were 0.94 minutes per flight higher in 2025.
- The main drivers of delays were weather, accounting for 2.35 of the total delays, and other non-ATC causes, responsible for 2.09.

1.6 Cost-efficiency (En route/Terminal charging zone(s))



- The en route 2025 actual unit cost of the Netherlands was 106.12€2022, +3.7% higher than the determined unit cost (102.29€2022). The terminal 2025 actual unit cost was 224.05€2022, -2.8% lower than the determined unit cost (230.40€2022).
- The en route 2025 actual service units (2.9M) were -5.3% lower than the determined service units (3.1M).
- The en route 2025 actual total costs were -5.6M€2022 (-1.8%) lower than determined. This is mainly due to lower staff costs for LVNL (-6.0M€2022, or -4.2%). The NSA explained that the decrease in staff costs is mainly attributable to a higher number of vacancies at LVNL and greater than expected employee attrition.

- LVNL spent 33.7M€2022 in 2025 related to costs of investments for both en route and terminal charging zones, +2.9% more than determined (32.8M€2022). According to the NSA, this is mainly due to the need to prolong the lease of additional communication lines for contingency backup purposes in one project.
- The en route actual unit cost incurred by users in 2025 was 114.48 € (+3.0% above the 2025 DUC), while the terminal actual unit cost incurred by users was 251.30€ (in line with the 2025 DUC). The difference between the AUCU and the DUC for the en route charging zone is mainly driven by the traffic risk sharing adjustment.

2 SAFETY - NETHERLANDS

2.1 PRB monitoring

- In 2025, LVNL achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for three out of five components of the EoSM. The components where LVNL missed the planned levels were Safety Policy and Objectives and Safety Promotion.
- The rate of runway incursions (RI) was 6.41 at airport level, higher than the Union-wide average. The rate of RIs with ANS contribution was 1.60, higher than the Union-wide average. In 2024, the Netherlands reported 0 runway incursions.
- The rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) at State level was 13.42, and at ANSP level 15.17. Both indicators were significantly above the Union-wide average. At ANSP level, rate of SMIs has decreased compared to 2024.

2.2 Effectiveness of Safety Management (EoSM) (KPI#1)



Focus on EoSM

In 2025, LVNL achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for three out of five components of the EoSM. The components where LVNL missed the planned levels were Safety Policy and Objectives and Safety Promotion.

In terms of main measures put in place to achieve the safety performance targets, the report defines that LVNL developed a safety management system development plan for RP4. This SMS development plan is a stark framework describing that for every RP4 year, LVNL will develop SMS elements in steps, according to various sources (SoE CANSO/Eurocontrol, internal needs, perceived gaps) but mainly based on the EoSM questionnaire results. On board/executive level, LVNL has defined a new safety policy and three strategic safety objectives for the long term (end of RP4, so 2029 - 2030).

In terms of remedial actions implemented or planned, as described in the monitoring report, the SMS development plan and the associated annual RP4 plan should support the development of the necessary EoSM 'levels' to the required RP4 targets. The new safety policy, strategic objectives and the annual plans should ensure LVNL achieves the RP4 targets.

Furthermore, according to the monitoring report, the NCA will continue to monitor the development of the organisation's SMS.

2.3 Safety occurrences

2.3.1 Rate of runway incursions (RIs) (PI#1) and Rate of runway incursion with ANS contribution (PI#3)



Rate of RIs per 100,000 airport movements - Netherlands						
#	Airport name	APT movements	Number of RI	Rate RI per 100,000	Number of RI with ANS contribution	Rate RI per 100,000 with ANS contribution
1	Amsterdam	496,040	14	2.82	7	1.41
2	Eelde	60,106	15	24.96	3	4.99
3	Rotterdam	58,654	7	11.93	0	0.00
4	Beek	9,203	4	43.46	0	0.00

Focus on runway incursions

The Netherlands reported 40 runway incursions (RI) for all airports listed in the performance plan (4) during 2025. When comparing the RIs at airport level to Union-wide level, the Netherlands was higher than Union-wide average (6.98 vs 2.70).

The Netherlands reported 10 RIs with ANS contribution. When comparing the RIs with ANS contribution to the Union-wide level, The Netherlands was higher than Union-wide average (1.74 vs 0.87).

As the Netherlands reported 0 Ris in 2024, the rate of runway incursions increased compared to 2024.

According to the monitoring report, the Netherlands has Runway Safety Teams dedicated per EASA airport and performs continuous monitoring of the amount of runway incursions and is in close contact with the LVNL Safety team. The rate of runway incursions is continuously evaluated during Risk Based Oversight sessions.

2.3.2 Rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) (PI#2) and Rate of separation minima infringements with ANS contribution (PI#4)





Rate of SMI with ANS contribution per 100,000 flight hours											
		Flight hours					Number of SMIs with ANS contribution				
#	ANSP	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
1	LVNL	560,462	NA	NA	NA	NA	85	NA	NA	NA	NA

		Rate of SMI with ANS contribution per 100,000 flight hours					% variation in rate of SMIs				
#	ANSP	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
1	LVNL	15	NA	NA	NA	NA					

Focus on separation minima

At State level, the Netherlands reported 106 separation minima infringements (SMI) in their airspace during 2025. The rate of separation minima infringements was higher than the Union-wide average (13.42 vs 7.87). At ANSP level, the Netherlands reported 85 SMI with ANS contribution. The rate of separation minima infringements at ANSP level was significantly higher than the Union-wide average (15.17 vs 6.02).

Comparison for 2024 at State level is not possible, as the Netherlands did not submit information on SMIs at State level in 2024.

At ANSP level however, the rate of separation minima infringements has decreased compared to 2024 (15.17 vs 21.07).

According to the monitoring report, SMI's are reported on a regular basis, and discussed with the NCA during coordination meetings with the Safety Manager. Additionally adverse trends are also discussed during these meetings.

3 ENVIRONMENT - NETHERLANDS

3.1 PRB monitoring

- Netherlands registered a KEA performance of 2.84% compared to its local breakdown value of 2.92%. Whilst the local target for FABEC was not achieved, the Netherlands contributed positively towards Union-wide performance.
- KEP and KES remained stable in comparison with 2024.
- VFE of the actual trajectory was at 78.5%, which was better than the Union-wide average.
- The average time in level flight during descent improved marginally and during climb remained stable compared to 2024.
- Additional taxi-out time was 3.25 min/flight which improved marginally compared to 2024, and additional taxi-in time was 1.87 min/flight which improved compared to 2.17 min/flight in 2024.
- Additional time in the arrival sequencing and metering area improved marginally from 2.67 min/flight to 2.59 min/flight in 2025.

3.2 En route performance

3.2.1 Horizontal flight efficiency of the actual trajectory (KEA) (KPI#1), of the last filed flight plan (KEP) (PI#1) , shortest constrained route (KES) (PI#2) and vertical flight efficiency of the actual trajectory (VFE) (PI#3)











Focus on en route performance

KEA

The Netherlands measure the same value of KEA of the previous year (2.84%), and a slight improvement for the KEA considering the effect of the war in Ukraine (2.69% in 2025 vs 2.72% in 2024). These values rank the Netherlands as 14th for KEA and 21st for corrected KEA.

In terms of the overall contribution to the additional distance in the SES area, the value is 1.9% (14th).

Regarding the assessment of the achieved level of actual performance in the environment KPA, the NSA reports: *"The Netherlands achieved the KEA target in 2025. The performance slightly improved compared to 2024."*

Regarding the implementation of major operational or structural changes during the calendar year impacting performance in this key performance area, the NSA reports: *"In March 2025 PYXIS 2A was implemented, an airspace redesign in the northeast of the Netherlands, northwest of Germany and south of Denmark. The change means a dualisation of two Amsterdam in and outbound routes but more important for this PI is that it is a preparation for the establishment of a cross border military area which will be the best compromise between improving the military mission effectiveness and minimising the impact on civil traffic. The area is planned for 2026.*

PYXIS resulted in shorter routes for some city pairs, but longer routes for other city pairs. Hence, the impact on HFE performance is difficult to determine and depends on the traffic demand."

Regarding progress on the implementation of the measures committed to in the ERNIP, the NSA reports: *"[LVNL, MUAC to confirm ERNIP status]"*

KEP

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"LVNL: simultaneously with PYXIS a route in the western part of LVNL airspace was made more direct. This direct was already often given in the actual operation, but was formalised so that it can be planned.*

Additionally, in RP4 LVNL plans to implement the use of LARA for advanced FUA, making temporary reserved areas available for civil traffic more efficiently, allowing airspace users to make use of more efficient routes."

KES

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"LVNL: simultaneously with PYXIS a route in the western part of LVNL airspace was made more direct. This direct was already often given in the actual operation, but was formalised so that it can be planned.*

Additionally, in RP4 LVNL plans to implement the use of LARA for advanced FUA, making temporary reserved areas available for civil traffic more efficiently, allowing airspace users to make use of more efficient routes."

Vertical flight efficiency

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"LVNL has hardly any contribution to this PI, as most flights in the cruising phase are above FL245, so outside LVNL's area of responsibility. No specific measures are planned."*

3.3 Terminal performance

3.3.1 Additional taxi-out time (AXOT) (PI#4), Additional taxi-in time (AXIT) (PI#5) & Arrival Sequencing and Metering Area (ASMA) time (PI#6)





Airport level															
	Additional taxi-out time (PI#4)					Additional ASMA time (PI#6)					Additional taxi-in time (PI#5)				
Airport	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Amsterdam	3.25	NA	NA	NA	NA	2.59	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.87	NA	NA	NA	NA

Focus on AXOT, AXIT & ASMA

AXOT

Amsterdam Schiphol is the only Dutch airport subject to the monitoring of this indicator.

The additional time in 2025 decreased to 3.25 min/dep, 5% below 2024 value – last year of RP3 – of 3.41 min/dep (*using the new methodology*).

The average for RP4 airports subject to monitoring of this indicator across Member States in 2025 was 3.61 min/dep.

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"No specific measures have been implemented or are planned. Performance very much depends on the runways in use, which depends on the weather conditions. E.g. the higher the share of flights departing from runway 36L, the higher the taxi-out additional time. This is because the absolute taxi-out time for this runway is high, which means that the additional time is relatively large in an absolute sense as well. Moreover, taxi times to this runway may be negatively influenced by the taxi route, as with some runway combinations departures 36L have to taxi around runway 18C/36C to avoid crossing an active runway. The reference time is determined by traffic that can cross the (inactive) runway."*

AXIT

Amsterdam Schiphol is the only Dutch airport subject to the monitoring of this indicator.

The additional time in 2025 was equal to 1.87 min/arr.

The average for RP4 airports subject to monitoring of this indicator across Member States in 2025 was 1.71 min/arr.

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"No specific measures have been implemented or are planned. Performance very much depends on the runways in use, which depends on the weather conditions. E.g. the higher the share of flights landing on runway 18R, the higher the taxi-in additional time. This is because the absolute taxi-in time for this runway is high, which means that the additional time is relatively large in an absolute sense as well. Moreover, taxi times from this runway may be negatively influenced by the taxi route, as with some runway combinations landings on 18R have to taxi around runway 18C/36C to avoid crossing an active runway. The reference time is determined by traffic that can cross the (inactive) runway."*

ASMA

Amsterdam Schiphol is the only Dutch airport subject to the monitoring of this indicator.

The additional time in 2025 was equal to 2.59 min/arr, very close to 2024 value – last year of RP3 – of 2.67 min/arr (*using the new methodology*).

The average for RP4 airports subject to monitoring of this indicator across Member States in 2025 was 2.98 min/arr.

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"No specific measures are planned. Performance is significantly driven by usage of parallel runways, for which traffic is lined up further from the runway than for non-parallel approaches, to ensure vertical separation when turning to base leg. The performance during non-parallel approaches determines the reference time. The runway combination itself depends largely on weather conditions and using noise preferent runways as much as possible, as is as such difficult to steer by LVNL."*

3.3.2 Vertical flight efficiency of the descent (PI#7) and of the climb (PI#8)



Focus on vertical flight efficiency of the descent and of the climb

Vertical flight efficiency of the descent

Compared to the overall RP4 average value (149.2 seconds per flight), average times flown level during descent are on average 4.8 seconds per flight lower in the Netherlands. The highest average time flown level during descent happens at Eelde (EHGG) (419.4 seconds per flight), while the lowest happens at Amsterdam (EHAM) (138 seconds per flight).

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"Detailed monthly monitoring of performance has started for EHAM; the same is in development for the other airports. Based on detailed analyses, measures to improve performance will be developed. These will focus on reducing the time in level flight, not specifically the share of CDOs."*

Vertical flight efficiency of the climb

Compared to the overall RP4 average value (34.8 seconds per flight), average times flown level during climb are on average 5.6 seconds per flight lower in the Netherlands. The highest average time flown level during climb happens at Eelde (EHGG) (110.9 seconds per flight), while the lowest happens at Amsterdam (EHAM) (26 seconds per flight).

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"Detailed monthly monitoring of performance has started for EHAM; the same is planned to be implemented for the other airports in 2025. Based on detailed analyses, measures to improve performance will be developed, but possibilities are limited, given the already good performance."*

Airport level										
	Avg. duration in climb (PI#8)					Avg. duration in descent (PI#7)				
Airport	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Amsterdam	26.0	NA	NA	NA	NA	138.0	NA	NA	NA	NA
Beek	60.0	NA	NA	NA	NA	305.7	NA	NA	NA	NA
Eelde	110.9	NA	NA	NA	NA	419.4	NA	NA	NA	NA
Rotterdam	69.6	NA	NA	NA	NA	170.9	NA	NA	NA	NA

3.4 Civil-Military dimension







Focus on Civil-Military dimension

Effective use of reserved or segregated local airspace

NETHERLANDS reports a ratio of **94.82%**

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"For FABEC the data was retrieved from: https://www.sesperformance.eu/dataportal/data/. The guidane material states that the data for PI #9, #10, and #11 should be provided by the Network Manager. However, the data is not complete, only the ratios are provided by NM and on a state level (not on the ACC level). Therefore, the data is only provided at a state level (ratios only)."*

Rate of planning via available airspace structures

NETHERLANDS reports that:

- The ratio of planning via available airspace structures is **20.24%** (via available restricted and segregated airspaces)
- The ratio of planning via available airspace structures is **37.90%** (via available conditional routes – CDR)

Rate of using available airspace structures

NETHERLANDS reports that:

- The ratio of the use of the available airspace structures is **27,43%** (via available restricted and segregated airspaces)
- The ratio of the use of the available airspace structures is **62.70%** (via available conditional routes – CDR)

4 CAPACITY - NETHERLANDS

4.1 PRB monitoring

- Netherlands registered 0.13 minutes of average en route ATFM delay per flight during 2025, which has been adjusted to 0.14 during the post-ops adjustment process, thus achieving the local target value of 0.16. Delays in Netherlands increased by 0.06 minutes per flight year-on-year.
- Delays were highest in June, August and September, mostly driven by other non-ATC causes but with notable contributions from weather and ATC capacity.
- The share of delayed flights with delays longer than 15 minutes in Netherlands increased by 6 percentage points compared to 2024 but was lower than 2019 values.
- The number of ATCOs in OPS was 79 FTEs in Amsterdam ACC, being below the 2025 plan by -2 FTEs.
- The yearly total of sector opening hours in Amsterdam ACC was 39,701, showing a -1% decrease compared to 2024.
- Amsterdam ACC registered 14.00 IFR movements per sector opening hour in 2025, 1% above the level recorded in 2024.
- Netherlands registered an average airport arrival ATFM delay of 4.44 minutes per flight in 2025, thus not achieving the local target of 2.2 minutes. Compared to 2024, average arrival ATFM delays in Netherlands were 0.94 minutes per flight higher in 2025.
- The main drivers of delays were weather, accounting for 2.35 of the total delays, and other non-ATC causes, responsible for 2.09.

4.2 En route performance

4.2.1 En route ATFM delay (KPI#1)







Focus on en route ATFM delay

En route ATFM delay

- The Netherlands had 1,239k flights in 2025, lower than the 1,254k flights in 2024.
- En route ANSPs in the Netherlands: LVNL and MUAC (DECO sector group), applied en route ATFM regulations resulting in 96k minutes of delay in 2025, a decrease from the 119k minutes in 2024.
- Following the NM post operations re-attributions process, the en route ANSPs in the Netherlands were responsible for 93k minutes of en route ATFM delay, compared to 115k minutes in 2024.

Regarding the reasons and circumstances resulting in the achieved level of actual performance of the en route ATFM delay per flight KPI, the NSA reports: *"LVNL achieved the target in 2025, although performance was worse than in 2024. The main reasons were severe weather and special events. Re-routings associated with security measures for the NATO summit in June caused overdemand in adjacent centres, and the delay from their regulations was re-attributed to LVNL. Furthermore, severe thunderstroms in July and parajumping events in August caused a decrease in sector capacity, and hence significant delays."*

Regarding the description of the adjustments to the capacity plan included in adopted performance plan, the NSA reports: *"For LVNL, the NOP 2025-2029 shows no bottleneck expected for Amsterdam ACC.*

According to the Network Operations Plan (NOP) 2025-2029 no capacity bottlenecks were expected for Amsterdam ACC. Capacity can still be increased until the traffic demand reaches the 2019 levels. As such, it is consistent with the required performance and no adjustments are needed."

Regarding remedial measures that have been / will be taken by the ANSP to rectify the situation, the NSA reports: *"LVNL: Target met — no remedial measures required."*

En route capacity incentive scheme

The FABEC NSAs report neither a financial penalty, nor a financial bonus, for either of the en route ANSPs operating over the Netherlands, because of the 2025 performance.

Individual en route incentive targets were set for both LVNL and MUAC (global).

For LVNL, the local incentive target for en route ATFM delays, due to CRSTMP causes only, was set at 0.1 mins/flight, (with a deadband of +/- 0.02 mins).

The FABEC NSAs report an achieved CRSTMP performance, for LVNL, of 0.09 mins/flight using data from the ansperformance.eu dashboard including post ops adjustments. [NB The attribution of original delay causes on the ansperformance.eu dashboard is unverified.]

Although the local target was surpassed, the en route incentive capacity performance for LVNL fell inside the deadband, where no bonus is applicable.

For MUAC, the local incentive target for en route AFTM delays, due to CRSTMP causes only, was set at 0.19 mins/flight, (with a deadband of +/- 0.04 mins).

The FABEC NSAs report an achieved CRSTMP performance of 0.18 mins/flight using data from the ansperformance.eu dashboard including post ops adjustments. [NB The attribution of original delay causes on the ansperformance.eu dashboard is unverified.]

Although the local target was surpassed, the en route incentive capacity performance for MUAC fell inside the deadband, where no bonus is applicable.

4.2.2 En route performance indicators at ACC level (PI#4-5)





Focus en route performance indicators at ACC level

Percentage of total en route ATFM delay that occurred on days when the daily throughput was above the expected daily traffic

As background information on actual performance, the NSA reports: *"As it is the first year of reporting on this PI, it is still difficult to provide a meaningful assessment of performance. The NSA will closely monitor the performance of this PI over the coming years."*

Annual weighted average of the daily peak throughput

As background information on actual performance, the NSA reports: *"The daily peak throughput of Amsterdam ACC slightly increased in 2025 compared to 2024, but no specific measures were taken. The increase was caused by the traffic demand."*

4.2.3 Other en route information





Focus on other en route information

As additional comments to ATCOs in the scope of the performance scheme, the NSA reports: *"The actual ATCO figures are slightly lower than assumed in the performance plan. LVNL was able to deliver the required operational performance and stayed within the target for en-route delay."*

"The return on training investments and the impact of the additional training effort is clearly reflected in the training results and the total number of trainees in the training program. The outflow of ATCOs is higher than foreseen in the plan. The outflow figures are also impacted by the increased use of unplanned leave, such as parental leave and maternity leave."

Regarding the training process, including details on the effective failure rate and the process used to allocate newly qualified ATCOs between ACC, APP and TWR positions, the NSA reports: *"The return on training investments and the impact of the additional training effort is clearly reflected in the training results and the total number of trainees in the training program."*

4.3 Terminal performance

4.3.1 Arrival ATFM delay (KPI#2)





Focus on arrival ATFM delay

Arrival ATFM delay

Average ATFM arrival delay in Netherlands was 4.44 min/arr in 2025, the first year of RP4. The performance has worsened compared to 2024, last year of RP3, when there were 3.50 min/arr.

The ATFM arrival delay value is the second highest among RP4 states, and is mostly driven by the main airport, Amsterdam Schiphol, which showed 4.83 min/arr. Amsterdam Schiphol delay is almost exclusively caused by Aerodrome Capacity and Weather regulations.

The remaining airports (Groningen, Maastricht-Aachen and Rotterdam) all had results below 0.05 min/arr.

The average for RP4 airports subject to monitoring of ATFM Arrival delay across Member States in 2025 was 0.97 min/arr.

Regarding the reasons and circumstances resulting in the achieved level of actual performance of the arrival ATFM delay per flight KPI, the NSA reports: *"The performance in 2025 was significantly above the target, almost exclusively due to the performance at Amsterdam; for the other airports ATFM delays were nearly non-existent. The main reason for the delays at Amsterdam was a demand higher than the declared capacity, both during inbound peaks and outbound peaks. Like in 2024 delays during the latter were amplified by the non-availability of a fourth runway (only 2+1/1+2 runway usage) due to controller shortages at Schiphol. Hence, daily variations in the traffic demand around peak transitions could not be efficiently handled. Furthermore, there were significant delays due to severe weather, either strong winds or poor visibility, in January, May, September and October, which increased in May due to unavailability of a runway due to heavy maintenance. Finally, the security measures associated with the NATO summit caused additional delays."*

Regarding the identification and analysis by the NSA of the underlying reasons or circumstances having led to the performance target not being achieved, the NSA reports: *"The Airport ATFM delay per flight was not met in 2025, primarily due to aerodrome capacity and weather related incidents. Additionally, runway maintenance, the ATCO shortages, and the NATO summit in June of 2025 had an impact on the airport ATFM delay target. It should be noted that the CRSTMP delay target remained below the target values."*

Regarding recommendations to the ANSP to rectify the situation, the NSA reports: *"Long term corrective measures are expected to be feasible and LVNL is working with AAS, the main airline operators at schiphol and the slot coordinator to better spread traffic demand, possibly by improving the slot allocation. This with the aim of reducing bunch forming for inbound for inbound aircraft since this is one of the major causes of airport delay at schiphol. With the envisaged growth in traffic volume at schiphol this delay cause will gain importance in the coming years. LVNL is working on increasing their ATCO capacity with additional training for which the first effects will start to show at the end of 2025. It is expected that 2+2 runway usage will be partially available again as of summer 2026, this is expected to reduce delays."*

Regarding remedial measures that have been / will be taken by the ANSP to rectify the situation, the NSA reports: *"For measures that have been taken, see under point 3 below. The sector partners continue to work on reducing delays. The peak shaving is planned to be progressively extended to the rest of the day. Additionally, LVNL is trialing with dynamic capacity/rates, to improve the effectiveness of regulations and reduce delays in case regulations are needed."*

Regarding follow up of the remedial measures indicated in the previous monitoring report(s), the NSA reports: *"The Netherlands NSA: LVNL is working with AAS, the main airline operators at Schiphol and the slot coordinator to better spread traffic demand. The first step was implemented at the start of Summer 2026, for the first inbound peak period of the day. Moreover, LVNL has increased its ATCO capacity with additional training, making 2+2 runway usage possible again in the early morning, also from the beginning of the Summer season 2026."*

Terminal capacity incentive scheme

In the first year of RP4, with an ATFM Arr delay of 4.44 min/arr, the Netherlands did not achieve the national target of 2.20 min/arr. However, the pivot value for incentives (0.10 min/arr) is limited to CRSTMP delay causes. As State-reported CRSTMP delay of 0.07* min/arr falls within the bonus sliding range for the incentive scheme, the NSA calculates a financial bonus of EUR 159,397.32.

*Note that PRB calculates a CRSTMP delay of 0.062 min/arr, which would result in a higher financial bonus for the Netherlands. PRB has not been able to verify the reported value of 0.07 min/arr.

4.3.2 Other terminal performance indicators (PI#1-3)



Airport level										
	Avg arrival ATFM delay (KPI#2)					Slot adherence (PI#1)				
Airport name	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**
Amsterdam	4.83	NA	NA	NA	NA	98.6%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Beek	0.04	NA	NA	NA	NA	97.4%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Eelde	0.01	NA	NA	NA	NA	98.2%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Rotterdam	0.01	NA	NA	NA	NA	98.5%	NA	NA	NA	NA

	ATC pre departure delay (PI#2)					All causes pre departure delay (PI#3)				
Airport name	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**
Amsterdam	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	19.6	NA	NA	NA	NA

Focus on other terminal performance indicators

ATFM slot adherence

ATFM slot adherence in 2025 was equal to 98.6%, the same as 2024 value – last year of RP3. All individual airports had adherence above 97%. With regard to the 1.4% of flights that did not adhere, 0.5% were early and 0.9% were late.

The average for RP4 airports subject to monitoring of ATFM slot adherence across Member States in 2025 was 96.3%.

As background information on actual performance, the NSA reports: *"Performance has been nearly 100% throughout the years (including 2025), with small deviations per year. No specific measures were taken or are planned, because they are not needed."*

ATC pre-departure delay

Amsterdam Schiphol is the only Dutch airport subject to the monitoring of this indicator.

The calculation of the ATC pre-departure delay is based on the data provided by the airport operators through the Airport Operator Data Flow (APDF).

However, there are several quality checks before EUROCONTROL can produce the final value which is established as the average minutes of pre-departure delay (delay in the actual off

block time) associated to the IATA delay code 89 (through the APDF, for each delayed flight, the reasons for that delay have to be transmitted and coded according to IATA delay codes.

However, sometimes the airport operator has no information concerning the reasons for the delay in the off block, or they cannot convert the reasons to the IATA delay codes. In those cases, the airport operator might:

- Not report any information about the reasons for the delay for that flight (unreported delay)
- Report a special code to indicate they do not have the information (code ZZZ)
- Report a special code to indicate they do not have the means to collect or translate the information (code 999)

To be able to calculate with a minimum of accuracy the PI for a given month, the minutes of delay that are not attributed to any IATA code reason should not exceed 40% of the total minutes of pre-departure delay observed at the airport.

As background information on actual performance, the NSA reports: *"data gap noted."*

Regarding the absence of data at airport level, the NSA reports: *"As was the case for RP3, this data should be provided by the airport, not the ANSP."*

All causes pre-departure delay

Amsterdam Schiphol is the only Dutch airport subject to the monitoring of this indicator.

Delay in 2025 decreased to 19.58 min/dep, 8% lower than 2024 value– last year of RP3 – of 21.20 min/dep.

The average for RP4 airports subject to monitoring of all causes pre-departure delay across Member States in 2025 was 16.47 min/dep.

As background information on actual performance, the NSA reports: *"LVNL is working with AAS, the main airline operators at Schiphol to improve the outbound punctuality. The first step was to reduce reactionary delays, by reducing the delays for inbound flights. Further measures will focus on improving the turnaround performance and reducing the local start-up delays."*

Regarding the absence of data at airport level, the NSA reports: *"All cause departure delay is very generic and ATFM delay is only a small contributor. Departure delay can be generated by ATFM en-route delay (not only local airport, but the complete Network) but also reactionary and turnaround delay, technical issues with the aircraft, airport operations, problems with passengers and or luggage, etc. In other words, it is not always possible to address a specific reason as this delay is quite generic. It would be more interesting to check the overall ANSP share against the share of the other network stakeholders (airports and AOs) and also show the weather induced subshare."*

5 COST-EFFICIENCY - NETHERLANDS

5.1 PRB monitoring

- The en route 2025 actual unit cost of the Netherlands was 106.12€2022, +3.7% higher than the determined unit cost (102.29€2022). The terminal 2025 actual unit cost was 224.05€2022, -2.8% lower than the determined unit cost (230.40€2022).
- The en route 2025 actual service units (2.9M) were -5.3% lower than the determined service units (3.1M).
- The en route 2025 actual total costs were -5.6M€2022 (-1.8%) lower than determined. This is mainly due to lower staff costs for LVNL (-6.0M€2022, or -4.2%). The NSA explained that the decrease in staff costs is mainly attributable to a higher number of vacancies at LVNL and greater than expected employee attrition.
- LVNL spent 33.7M€2022 in 2025 related to costs of investments for both en route and terminal charging zones, +2.9% more than determined (32.8M€2022). According to the NSA, this is mainly due to the need to prolong the lease of additional communication lines for contingency backup purposes in one project.
- The en route actual unit cost incurred by users in 2025 was 114.48 € (+3.0% above the 2025 DUC), while the terminal actual unit cost incurred by users was 251.30€ (in line with the 2025 DUC). The difference between the AUCU and the DUC for the en route charging zone is mainly driven by the traffic risk sharing adjustment.

5.2 En route charging zone

5.2.1 Unit cost (KPI#1)





Actual and determined data					
Total costs - nominal (M€)	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**
Determined costs	341.4	348.2	372.9	380.5	389.0
Actual costs	335.8	NA	NA	NA	NA
Difference costs	-5.6	NA	NA	NA	NA

Inflation assumptions	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Determined inflation rate	2.8%	2.3%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%
Determined inflation index*	110.4	113	115.2	117.5	119.9
Actual inflation rate	3.0%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Actual inflation index*	110.7	NA	NA	NA	NA
Difference inflation index (p.p.)	+0.3	NA	NA	NA	NA

*100 = 2022





Focus on unit cost

AUC vs. DUC

In 2025, the en route AUC was +3.7% (or +3.83 €2022) higher than the planned DUC. This results from the combination of significantly lower than planned TSUs (-5.3%) and lower than planned en route costs in real terms (-1.8%, or -5.6 M€2022).

En route service units

The difference between actual and planned TSUs (-5.3%) falls outside the ±2% dead-band, but does not exceed the ±10% threshold foreseen in the traffic risk sharing mechanism. The resulting loss of en route revenues is therefore shared between the ANSP and the airspace users (see the main ANSP regulatory result).

En route costs by entity

Actual real en route costs are -1.8% (-5.6 M€2022) lower than planned. This is the result of lower costs for the main ANSP, LVNL (-2.0%, or -4.3 M€2022), the other ANSP (MUAC, -2.1%, or -1.3 M€2022) and the MET service provider (-2.8%, or -0.4 M€2022) and higher costs for the NSA/EUROCONTROL (+1.6%, or +0.3 M€2022).

En route costs for the main ANSP (LVNL) at charging zone level

Based on the additional information to the en route reporting tables, the lower than planned en route costs in real terms for LVNL in 2025 (-2.0%, or -4.3 M€2022) result from:

- Lower than planned staff costs (-4.2%), mainly due to the continued tight labour market in the Netherlands, which resulted in more vacancies than expected, together with higher than expected employee attrition. LVNL reports that it aims to encourage temporarily hired staff to move to permanent employment contracts, an approach which reduces costs

but also decreases cost flexibility. However, the en route charging zone benefits less from this approach than the terminal charging zone, as significant external hiring is still required for the iCAS projects.

- Higher than planned other operating costs (+1.7%), mainly due to higher than expected external staff costs, in line with the explanation provided for staff costs above, notably the continued need for significant external hiring for the iCAS projects. Other cost elements show only minor changes.
- Depreciation consistent with the plan (+0.04%).
- Significantly higher than planned cost of capital (+15.8%), mainly due to a higher allocation of cost of capital to en route, reflecting the significant share of en route projects related to iCAS and its prerequisite projects. In addition, the repayment of COVID-related debt has slowed due to a lower number of en route service units in 2025, resulting in the associated interest expenses decreasing at a slower pace.
- Higher than planned deduction for VFR exempted flights (+3.1%).

It should be noted that LVNL has updated and revised its cost allocation model and applied it on the actual 2025 figures. According to the information provided, this was necessary due to the foreseen civil-military integration taking place at the end of 2026. It is understood that the update enables a more accurate allocation of military services costs with respect to staff costs and the hiring of temporary personnel as part of other operating expenses for en route and terminal. There is no impact on the total cost bases of en route and terminal.

Assessment of the actual performance in the charging zone reported by the NSA

The NSA of Netherlands provides the following overall assessment of the actual performance in 2025 at charging zone level:

"For the Netherlands en route charging zone, the unit cost is higher than planned by 3.5%, primarily caused by lower-than-forecast traffic, resulting in a 3.5% decrease in the number of service units. Despite a 3.6% decrease in determined cost, this reduction was not enough to offset the impact of reduced traffic."

[It should be noted that some of the amounts indicated by the NSA in the analysis cited above differ from the amounts reported in the respective data tables in the same NSA Monitoring Report and in the submission of en route reporting tables (both of which are aligned).]

Explanation of the differences between actual and determined costs at charging zone level reported by the NSA

The NSA provides the following explanation for the differences between actual and determined costs in the charging zone:

"For individual organisations:

LVNL achieved a lower total cost base, mainly due to reduced personnel costs; however, its cost of capital increased due to higher-than-planned inflation.

MUAC, the cost base is lower than planned because lower operating costs outweighed an increase in personnel costs.

KNMI, a reduced cost base is driven by lower personnel expenses, though this was partially offset by increased operating costs associated with external staffing.

NSA's higher cost base is driven by the need to expand the organisation, which has led to increased staff costs."

Recommendations formulated by the NSA to the ANSP (LVNL) to rectify the situation and actions taken by the ANSP

The NSA 2025 monitoring report indicates the following recommendations formulated by the NSA:

"The NSA recommends to the ASNP's to look for further cost reduction measures while noting that the traffic variation has a dominant effect on the ability to reach the DUC target"

LVNL reports the implementation of the following actions:

"Cost reduction has been achieved through lower personnel cost and lowering of operating costs."

5.2.2 Actual unit cost incurred by the users (AUCU) (PI#1)



AUCU components (€/SU) – 2025	
Components of the AUCU in 2025	**€/SU**
DUC	**111.18**
Inflation adjustment	0.23
Cost exempt from cost sharing	0.10
Traffic risk sharing adjustment	2.44
Traffic adjustment (costs not TRS)	0.67
Financial incentives	0.00
Modulation of charges	0.00
Cross-financing	0.00
Other revenues	-0.15
Application of lower unit rate	0.00
Total adjustments	3.29
AUCU	**114.48**
AUCU vs. DUC	**+ 3.0%**



Cost exempt from cost sharing – 2025		
Cost exempt from cost sharing by item - 2025	**€'000**	**€/SU**
New and existing investments	-538.2	-0.19
Competent authorities and qualified entities costs	531.3	0.18
Eurocontrol costs	-193.5	-0.07
Pension costs	830.2	0.29
Interest on loans	-343.5	-0.12
Changes in law	0.0	0.00
Total cost exempt from cost risk sharing	**286.2**	**0.10**

Focus on AUCU

En route AUCU monitoring at charging zone level

The actual en route unit cost incurred by airspace users (AUCU) in respect of activities performed in 2025 (114.48 €) is +3.0% higher than the nominal DUC (111.18 €) which includes DUC initially charged: 110.98 €, and DUC to be charged retroactively: 0.21 €. The difference between the AUCU and the nominal DUC (+3.29 €/SU) is due to:

- the positive inflation adjustment resulting from higher than planned inflation (+0.23 €/SU);
- the impact of adjustments resulting from the costs exempted from cost sharing mechanism (+0.10 €/SU);
- the addition of the traffic risk sharing adjustments (+2.44 €/SU);
- the addition of the traffic adjustment (+0.67 €/SU) for the costs not subject to traffic risk sharing; and,
- the deduction of other revenues (-0.15 €/SU).

The share of the regulatory result (see next sub-section) in the AUCU (before the deduction of other revenues) is -0.8%.

Initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI reported by the NSA

No information on such initiatives was provided in the NSA 2025 Monitoring Report.

5.2.3 Regulatory result (RR)



Focus on regulatory result

LVNL net gain/loss on activity in the Netherlands en route charging zone in 2025

LVNL reported a net loss of -1.9 M€, as a combination of a gain of +5.2 M€ arising from the cost sharing mechanism, with a loss of -7.1 M€ arising from the traffic risk sharing mechanism.

LVNL overall regulatory result (RR) for the en route activity

It should be noted that LVNL has no equity and its assets are entirely financed through debt. Therefore, ex-post, the overall RR is equal to the net loss from the en route activity mentioned above (-1.9 M€, corresponding to -0.8% of the en route revenues).

5.3 Terminal charging zone

5.3.1 Unit cost (KPI#1)





Actual and determined data					
Total costs - nominal (M€)	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**
Determined costs	99.1	100.6	104.7	107.1	109.6
Actual costs	98.6	NA	NA	NA	NA
Difference costs	-0.5	NA	NA	NA	NA

Inflation assumptions	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**
Determined inflation rate	2.8%	2.3%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%
Determined inflation index*	110.4	113	115.2	117.5	119.9
Actual inflation rate	3.0%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Actual inflation index*	110.7	NA	NA	NA	NA
Difference inflation index (p.p.)	+0.3	NA	NA	NA	NA

*100 = 2022





Focus on unit cost

AUC vs. DUC

In 2025, the terminal AUC was -2.8% (or -6.35 €2022) lower than the planned DUC. This results from the combination of higher than planned TNSUs (+2.0%) and slightly lower than planned terminal costs in real terms (-0.9%, or -0.8 M€2022).

Terminal service units

The difference between actual and planned TNSUs (+2.0%) falls inside the ±2% dead-band. Hence, the gain of additional terminal revenues is kept by the ANSPs.

Terminal costs by entity

Actual real terminal costs are -0.9% (-0.8 M€2022) lower than planned. This is the result of lower costs for the main ANSP, LVNL (-0.8%, or -0.7 M€2022) and the MET service provider (-3.7%, or -0.1 M€2022).

Terminal costs for the main ANSP (LVNL) at charging zone level

Based on the additional information to the terminal reporting tables, the slightly lower than planned terminal costs in real terms for LVNL in 2025 (-0.8%, or -0.7 M€2022) result from:

- Significantly higher than planned staff costs (+7.7%), mainly due to the continued tight labour market in the Netherlands, which resulted in more vacancies than expected and required additional staffing measures. LVNL reports that it aims to encourage temporarily hired staff to move to permanent employment contracts, an approach which reduces costs but also decreases cost flexibility. While the en route charging zone benefits less from this approach due to the continued need for significant external hiring for the iCAS projects, terminal staff costs increased at a faster rate than en route staff costs. In addition, terminal operations required the procurement of additional ATCO capacity.
- Significantly lower than planned other operating costs (-20.4%), mainly due to lower than expected external staff costs, in line with the explanation provided for staff costs above. Other cost elements show only minor changes.
- Lower than planned depreciation (-4.6%), No further explanation of the drivers is provided in the additional information to the reporting tables, which only indicates that actual depreciation costs differed slightly from determined costs.
- Significantly lower than planned cost of capital (-27.1%). mainly due to a lower average interest on debt than planned, which more than offset the effect of a higher than planned total asset base.

It should be noted that LVNL has updated and revised its cost allocation model and applied it on the actual 2025 figures. According to the information provided, this was necessary due to the foreseen civil-military integration taking place at the end of 2026. It is understood that the update enables a more accurate allocation of military services costs with respect to staff costs and the hiring of temporary personnel as part of other operating expenses for en route and terminal. There is no impact on the total cost bases of en route and terminal.

Assessment of the actual performance in the charging zone reported by the NSA

The NSA of Netherlands provides the following overall assessment of the actual performance in 2025 at charging zone level:

"For the Netherlands terminal charging zone, the unit cost is lower than planned by -5,5%. This is driven by an increased number of service units (+2,0%) and a lower-than-planned determined cost (-3,7%)."

[It should be noted that some of the amounts indicated by the NSA in the analysis cited above differ from the amounts reported in the respective data tables in the same NSA Monitoring Report and in the submission of terminal reporting tables (both of which are aligned).]

Explanation of the differences between actual and determined costs at charging zone level reported by the NSA

The NSA provides the following explanation for the differences between actual and determined costs in the charging zone:

"For individual organisations:

LVNL achieved a lower total cost base, mainly due to reduced personnel costs; however, its cost of capital increased due to higher-than-planned inflation.

MUAC, the cost base is lower than planned because lower operating costs outweighed an increase in personnel costs.

KNMI, a reduced cost base is driven by lower personnel expenses, though this was partially offset by increased operating costs associated with external staffing.

NSA's higher cost base is driven by the need to expand the organisation, which has led to increased staff costs."

[It should be noted that the extract from the NSA 2025 monitoring report cited above lists the en route entities whereas it is reported under "terminal ANS" section of the report.]

Recommendations formulated by the NSA to the ANSP (LVNL) to rectify the situation and actions taken by the ANSP

The NSA 2025 monitoring report indicates the following recommendations formulated by the NSA:

"The NSA recommends to the ASNP's to look for further cost reduction measures while noting that the traffic variation has a dominant effect on the ability to reach the DUC target."

LVNL reports the implementation of the following actions:

"Cost reduction has been achieved through lower personnel cost and lowering of operating costs."

5.3.2 Actual unit cost incurred by the users (AUCU) (PI#1)



AUCU components (€/SU) – 2025	
Components of the AUCU in 2025	**€/SU**
DUC	**251.38**
Inflation adjustment	0.51
Cost exempt from cost sharing	-0.45
Traffic risk sharing adjustment	0.00
Traffic adjustment (costs not TRS)	-0.17
Financial incentives	0.40
Modulation of charges	0.00
Cross-financing	0.00
Other revenues	-0.36
Application of lower unit rate	0.00
Total adjustments	-0.07
AUCU	**251.30**
AUCU vs. DUC	**0.0%**



Cost exempt from cost sharing – 2025		
Cost exempt from cost sharing by item - 2025	**€'000**	**€/SU**
New and existing investments	-435.7	-1.08
Competent authorities and qualified entities costs	0.0	0.00
Eurocontrol costs	0.0	0.00
Pension costs	377.4	0.94
Interest on loans	-124.0	-0.31
Changes in law	0.0	0.00
Total cost exempt from cost risk sharing	**-182.2**	**-0.45**

Focus on AUCU

Terminal AUCU monitoring at charging zone level

The actual terminal unit cost incurred by airspace users (AUCU) in respect of activities performed in 2025 (251.30 €) is almost in line with the nominal DUC (251.38), which includes DUC initially charged: 249.48 €, and DUC to be charged retroactively: 1.90 €. This result reflects a combination of:

- the positive inflation adjustment resulting from higher than planned inflation (+0.51 €/SU);
- the impact of adjustments resulting from the costs exempted from cost sharing mechanism (-0.45 €/SU);
- the deduction of the traffic adjustment (-0.17 €/SU) for the costs not subject to traffic risk sharing;
- the impact of financial incentives (+0.40 €/SU); and,
- the deduction of other revenues (-0.36 €/SU).

The share of the regulatory result (see next sub-section) in the AUCU (before the deduction of other revenues) is 2.6%.

Initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI reported by the NSA

No information on such initiatives was provided in the NSA 2025 Monitoring Report.

5.3.3 Regulatory result (RR)









Focus on regulatory result

LVNL net gain/loss on activity in the Netherlands terminal charging zone in 2025

LVNL reported a net gain of +2.5 M€, as a combination of a gain of +0.4 M€ arising from the cost sharing mechanism, with a gain of +1.9 M€ arising from the traffic risk sharing mechanism and a gain of +0.2 M€ relating to financial incentives.

LVNL overall regulatory result (RR) for the terminal activity

It should be noted that LVNL has no equity and its assets are entirely financed through debt. Therefore, ex-post, the overall RR is equal to the net gain from the terminal activity mentioned above (+2.5 M€, corresponding to 2.5% of the terminal revenues).