PERFORMANCE REVIEW BOARD
of the Single European Sky

Performance Review Board

Monitoring Report

Malta - 2025

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Contents

1 OVERVIEW

1.1 Contextual information

This document is based on the version of the Annual Monitoring Report file submitted by the state on 2026-06-12 (`MT12375_MT12074_Malta_prefilled AMR 2025 for signature 2026.06.12.xlsx`) and the accompanying submission of en route and terminal (if applicable) reporting tables.

National performance plan adopted following Commission Decision (EU) 2025/1060 of 19 May 2025

List of ACCs 1
Malta ACC

No of airports in the scope of the performance plan:
- **≥80'K** 0
- **<80'K** 1

Exchange rate (1 EUR=)
2022: 1 EUR
2025: 1 EUR

Share of Union-wide:
- **traffic (TSUs) 2025** 0.9%
- **en route costs 2025** 0.3%

Share en route / terminal costs 2025 76% / 24%

En route charging zone(s)
Malta

Terminal charging zone(s)
Malta

Main ANSP
- MATS

Other ANSPs
- Malta International Airport Plc.

MET Providers
- MIA MET

1.2 Traffic (En route traffic zone)



- Malta recorded 167K actual IFR movements in 2025, +13.3% compared to 2024 (148K).
- Actual 2025 IFR movements were +6.7% above the plan (157K).
- Actual 2025 IFR movements were +28.3% above the actual 2019 level (130K).



- Malta recorded 1,286K actual service units in 2025, +16.1% compared to 2024 (1,108K).
- Actual 2025 service units were +10.5% above the plan (1,164K).
- Actual 2025 service units are +26.1% above the actual 2019 level (1,020K).

1.3 Safety (Main ANSP)



- In 2025, MATS achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM.
- The rate of runway incursions (RI) was 9.64 and equal to the RIs with ANS contribution, with both indicators significantly higher than the Union-wide average. Compared to 2024, rate of RIs has decreased at airport level but increased at airport level with ATS/CNS contribution.
- The rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) at State level was 3.00 and equal to the SMIs with ATS/CNS contribution, with both indicators lower than the Union-wide average. The rate of SMIs has increased slightly at both State level and ANSP level when comparing to 2024.

1.4 Environment (Member State)



- Malta registered a KEA performance of 1.67%. Their target of 1.56% was not achieved and Malta did not contribute positively to Union-wide performance. The NSA states that environmental performance at local level was affected mainly by the wider network context, including traffic growth above forecast and changes in traffic patterns linked to geopolitical developments affecting route choices across the network.
- KEP and KES both deteriorated in comparison with 2024.
- VFE of the actual trajectory was at 79.28%, which was better than the Union-wide average.
- No airports are included in the performance plan for monitoring.

1.5 Capacity (Member State)



- Malta registered 0.03 minutes of average en route ATFM delay per flight during 2025, which remained 0.03 after the post-ops adjustment process, thus achieving the local target value of 0.03. Delays in Malta increased by 0.03 minutes per flight year-on-year.
- The number of ATCOs in OPS was 53 being below the 2025 plan in Malta ACC by -2 FTE.

- The yearly total of sector opening hours in Malta ACC was 12,127, showing a 26% increase compared to 2024.
- Malta ACC registered 13.95 IFR movements per sector opening hour in 2025, being -12% below 2024 levels.
- Malta registered an average airport arrival ATFM delay of 0.18 minutes per flight in 2025, thus not achieving the local target of 0.01 minutes. Compared to 2024, average arrival ATFM delays in Malta were 0.18 minutes per flight higher in 2025.
- The main driver of delays was other non-ATC causes, accounting for 0.17 of the total delays.

1.6 Cost-efficiency (En route/Terminal charging zone(s))



- The en route 2025 actual unit cost of Malta was 14.96€2022, -15.0% lower than the determined unit cost (17.61€2022). The terminal 2025 actual unit cost was 126.68€2022,

-10.8% lower than the determined unit cost (142.05€2022).

- The en route 2025 actual service units (1.3M) were +10.5% higher than the determined service units (1.2M).
- The en route 2025 actual total costs were -1.2M€2022 (-6.1%) lower than determined. This is mainly due to lower staff costs (-0.9M€2022, or -7.5%) and other operating costs (-0.7M€2022, or -26.8%) for MATS. According to the NSA, staff costs decreased mainly due to retirements exceeding plan and a delay in recruitment, while the reduction in other operating costs was mainly due to lower insurance costs.
- MATS spent 3.0M€2022 in 2025 related to costs of investments for both en route and terminal charging zones, +4.6% more than determined (2.8M€2022). According to the NSA, this increase is due greater investments in assets subject to higher depreciation than planned.
- The en route actual unit cost incurred by users in 2025 was 17.48€ (-8.1% below the 2025 DUC), while the terminal actual unit cost incurred by users was 88.29€ (-42.6% below the 2025 DUC). The difference between the AUCU and the DUC for the en route charging zone is mainly driven by traffic risk sharing adjustments. The difference between the AUCU and the DUC for the terminal charging zone is mainly driven by new and existing investments in cost exempt from cost sharing.

- The en route regulatory result for MATS amounted to +3.7M€, or 18.5% of the 2025 revenue. This may indicate that the airspace users are charged for costs which have not materialised in 2025.

2 SAFETY - MALTA

2.1 PRB monitoring

- In 2025, MATS achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM.
- The rate of runway incursions (RI) was 9.64 and equal to the RIs with ANS contribution, with both indicators significantly higher than the Union-wide average. Compared to 2024, rate of RIs has decreased at airport level but increased at airport level with ATS/CNS contribution.
- The rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) at State level was 3.00 and equal to the SMIs with ATS/CNS contribution, with both indicators lower than the Union-wide average. The rate of SMIs has increased slightly at both State level and ANSP level when comparing to 2024.

2.2 Effectiveness of Safety Management (EoSM) (KPI#1)



Focus on EoSM

In 2025, MATS achieved the planned maturity levels set out in its performance plan for all five components of the EoSM.

As described in the in the monitoring report, the ANSP initially proposed that some areas achieved D level. However, following NCA verification, these areas which were considered not to sufficiently demonstrate level D and were therefore assigned an actual value of C in the EOSM.

As further outlined in the monitoring report, the way the SMS is set, the continuous improvement process managed under MATS Quality Pillar (ISO 9001-2015), and the structure of the SQSC include, as one of the annual activity indicators, an internal safety performance report based on data extraction across all areas, including CNS availability, service delivery, management of occurrences (SMIs and RIs), and other required indicators. This provides MATS with an overview to support the management of results and the improvement of performance.

As also noted in the monitoring report, MATS completed a safety culture survey last year, which indicated that all safety targets were achieved.

2.3 Safety occurrences

2.3.1 Rate of runway incursions (RIs) (PI#1) and Rate of runway incursion with ANS contribution (PI#3)





Rate of RIs per 100,000 airport movements - Malta						
#	Airport name	APT movements	Number of RI	Rate RI per 100,000	Number of RI with ANS contribution	Rate RI per 100,000 with ANS contribution
1	Malta International	72,607	7	9.64	7	9.64

Focus on runway incursions

Malta reported 7 runway incursions (RI) at Luqa airport during 2025. When comparing the rate of RIs at airport level to Union-wide level, Malta was significantly higher than Union-wide average (9.64 vs 2.70).

Malta reported 7 RIs with ANS contribution in 2025. When comparing the rate of RIs at airport level with ANS contribution, Malta was significantly higher than Union-wide average (9.64 vs 0.87).

The rate of runway incursions has decreased compared to 2024 at airport level (9.64 vs 16.97) but increased at ANS contribution-level (9.64 vs 5.66).

As described in the monitoring report, a significant number of infrastructure works are ongoing at LMML. The aerodrome now includes the new Apron 8 lightning system, new stop bars, and resurfacing works, which have impacted MATS TWR operations. MATS routinely briefs the ATCO community and discusses progress with MIA and the NCA with a view to identify and implement improvements. MATS also briefs occurrences in the spot training, consisting of tailor-made exercises replicating actual occurrences used for training purposes.

2.3.2 Rate of separation minima infringements (SMIs) (PI#2) and Rate of separation minima infringements with ANS contribution (PI#4)





Rate of SMI with ANS contribution per 100,000 flight hours											
		Flight hours					Number of SMIs with ANS contribution				
#	ANSP	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
1	MATS	166,484	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA

		Rate of SMI with ANS contribution per 100,000 flight hours					% variation in rate of SMIs				
#	ANSP	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
1	MATS	3	NA	NA	NA	NA					

Focus on separation minima

At State level, Malta reported 5 separation minima infringements (SMI) in their airspace during 2025. The rate of separation minima infringements was lower than the Union-wide average (3.00 vs 7.87). At ANSP level, Malta reported 5 SMI with ANS contribution. The rate of separation minima infringements at ANSP level was lower than the Union-wide average (3.00 vs 6.02).

When comparing to 2024, the rate of separation minima infringements has increased slightly at both State level (3.00 vs 2.91) and at ANSP level (3.00 vs 2.91).

As reported in the monitoring report, the SMI PI is maintaining its trend and remains in the extremely low zone. Furthermore, MATS monitors, investigates, and briefs the ATCOs to ensure that achievement trends in this area are maintained and ATCOs are briefed annually on all SMIs and RIs. MATS considers that 5 SMIs in 2025 is a very low figure given the increase in traffic achieved.

3 ENVIRONMENT - MALTA

3.1 PRB monitoring

- Malta registered a KEA performance of 1.67%. Their target of 1.56% was not achieved and Malta did not contribute positively to Union-wide performance. The NSA states that environmental performance at local level was affected mainly by the wider network context, including traffic growth above forecast and changes in traffic patterns linked to geopolitical developments affecting route choices across the network.
- KEP and KES both deteriorated in comparison with 2024.
- VFE of the actual trajectory was at 79.28%, which was better than the Union-wide average.
- No airports are included in the performance plan for monitoring.

3.2 En route performance

3.2.1 Horizontal flight efficiency of the actual trajectory (KEA) (KPI#1), of the last filed flight plan (KEP) (PI#1) , shortest constrained route (KES) (PI#2) and vertical flight efficiency of the actual trajectory (VFE) (PI#3)











Focus on en route performance

KEA

With respect to 2024, there has been a degradation for the values of KEA and the KEA corrected for the influence of war in Ukraine. Kea went from 1.49% to 1.67%, while the corrected KEA went from 1.45% to 1.61%. In both cases they are relatively good values, as they Malta as 6th (for KEA) and 8th (for KEA corrected).

Moreover, Malta has the second lowest contribution to the overall additional distance in the SES area with 0.41%.

Regarding the assessment of the achieved level of actual performance in the environment KPA, the NSA reports: *"The 2025 target for horizontal en-route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory (KEA) was not achieved.*

Actual performance was 1.67% compared with the target of 1.56%.

The NSA considers that environmental performance at local level was affected mainly by the wider network context, including traffic growth above forecast and changes in traffic patterns linked to geopolitical developments affecting route choices across the network. This was particularly the case in the East Sector of LMMM during the 12-day war in the Middle East and its immediate aftermath. It is also noted that delays in the Greece FIR also affected LMMM as operators rerouted through LMMM to reduce flow control delays and therefore flight plans filed diverged from actual traffic routing.

No evidence was identified of a major local structural degradation in environmental performance attributable solely to the local service provision arrangements."

Regarding the implementation of major operational or structural changes during the calendar year impacting performance in this key performance area, the NSA reports: *"No major operational or structural changes were implemented in 2025 that would explain the variance in KEA. The local ANSP continued planning and investment activities relevant to future operational modernisation, including deployment-related projects under RP4, but these are expected to contribute primarily in the medium term rather than to have materially changed the 2025 KEA outcome."*

Regarding progress on the implementation of the measures committed to in the ERNIP, the NSA reports: *"Implementation continued in line with Malta's RP4 planning and wider network coordination arrangements.*

In particular, the investment programme continued to include initiatives supporting interoperability and network integration, such as the new SWIM-compliant ATM system and free-route-airspace-related developments.

The performance effect of these measures is expected to materialise progressively over RP4 & RP5.

Plans for in the introduction of PBN SIDs / STARs and a redesign of the TMA are still ongoing and will affect future years."

Regarding the identification and analysis by the NSA of the underlying reasons or circumstances having led to the performance target not being achieved, the NSA reports: *"The principal factors underlying the shortfall were traffic levels above forecast and the continued influence of wider network constraints and geopolitical routing and rerouting effects outside Malta's sole control. These factors affected the trajectories operated in the charging zone and reduced the likelihood of meeting the local KEA target despite the absence of any evidence of significant local capacity stress in en-route operations."*

Regarding recommendations to the ANSP to rectify the situation, the NSA reports: *"The NSA recommends that the ANSP continue to support network measures aimed at improving flight efficiency, including route design optimisation where feasible, timely implementation of network-relevant ATM modernisation projects, and continued coordination with the Network Manager. The NSA will continue to monitor the evolution of KEA, the related planning indicators (KEP/KES) and the implementation status of the relevant RP4 investments and network measures in subsequent annual monitoring cycles."*

Regarding remedial measures that have been / will be taken by the ANSP to rectify the situation, the NSA reports: *"While the Free Route Implementation in the Malta FIR / UIR has been achieved with full implementation by end Nov 2025, the introduction of RNAV SIDs and STARs previously planned for implementation in 2023 has experienced several delays. These delays are further delaying the introduction of CCO/CDO. MATS is looking forward to rectify this issue with urgency."*

Regarding the follow up of the remedial measures indicated in the previous monitoring report(s), the NSA reports: *"Not applicable."*

KEP

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"When the implementation of the PBN SIDs / STARs and the redesign of the TMA the PI is expected to improve."*

KES

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"The instability of flight planning due to the conflict in the Middle East / Persian Gulf can be regarded as a contributing factor for this result.*

FRA is fully available in the Malta FIR / UIR and no further initatives are being considered"

Vertical flight efficiency

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"The forthcoming introduction of RNAV SIDs / STARs with CDO and CCO procedures is planned to improve this value. At this stage, this project is still pending."*

3.3 Terminal performance

3.3.1 Vertical flight efficiency of the descent (PI#7) and of the climb (PI#8)



Focus on vertical flight efficiency of the descent and of the climb

Vertical flight efficiency of the descent

Compared to the overall RP4 average value (149.2 seconds per flight), average times flown level during descent are 94.1 seconds per flight lower in Malta. Malta/Luqa (LMML) has an average time flown level of 55.1 seconds per flight during descent.

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"None"*

Vertical flight efficiency of the climb

Compared to the overall RP4 average value (34.8 seconds per flight), average times flown level during climb are 16.8 seconds per flight lower in Malta. Malta/Luqa (LMML) has an average time flown level of 18 seconds per flight during climb.

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"None"*

Airport level										
	Avg. duration in climb (PI#8)					Avg. duration in descent (PI#7)				
Airport	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Malta/Luqa	18.0	NA	NA	NA	NA	55.1	NA	NA	NA	NA

3.4 Civil-Military dimension







Focus on Civil-Military dimension

Effective use of reserved or segregated local airspace

MALTA reports, no data available.

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"No data is available"*

Rate of planning via available airspace structures

MALTA reports, no data available.

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"Data is not available. Information available is limited to Reserved or Segregated Airspace (RSA) [Malta does not have CDR1 routes]:*

RAI = Rate of Aircraft Interested in reserved/restricted airspace: 64.84%,

RAU = Rate of Actual Use of reserved/restricted airspace: 76.85%,

ERSA = Effective Use of Reserved or Segregated Airspace: 96.38%"

Rate of using available airspace structures

MALTA reports, no data available.

Regarding initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI and how does the NSA intend on monitoring their effectiveness on performance, the NSA reports: *"Data is not available. Information available is limited to Reserved or Segregated Airspace (RSA) [Malta does not have CDR1 routes]:*

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4 CAPACITY - MALTA

4.1 PRB monitoring

- Malta registered 0.03 minutes of average en route ATFM delay per flight during 2025, which remained 0.03 after the post-ops adjustment process, thus achieving the local target value of 0.03. Delays in Malta increased by 0.03 minutes per flight year-on-year.
- The number of ATCOs in OPS was 53 being below the 2025 plan in Malta ACC by -2 FTE.
- The yearly total of sector opening hours in Malta ACC was 12,127, showing a 26% increase compared to 2024.
- Malta ACC registered 13.95 IFR movements per sector opening hour in 2025, being -12% below 2024 levels.
- Malta registered an average airport arrival ATFM delay of 0.18 minutes per flight in 2025, thus not achieving the local target of 0.01 minutes. Compared to 2024, average arrival ATFM delays in Malta were 0.18 minutes per flight higher in 2025.
- The main driver of delays was other non-ATC causes, accounting for 0.17 of the total delays.

4.2 En route performance

4.2.1 En route ATFM delay (KPI#1)







Focus on en route ATFM delay

En route ATFM delay

- Malta had 167k flights in 2025, up from the 148k flights in 2024.
- MATS applied en route ATFM regulations that resulted in 5k minutes of delay.

Regarding the reasons and circumstances resulting in the achieved level of actual performance of the en route ATFM delay per flight KPI, the NSA reports: *"The 2025 en-route ATFM delay per flight KPI was achieved at 0.03 minutes, equal to the target in the adopted performance plan. This outcome indicates that en-route capacity remained broadly aligned with demand despite traffic growth above forecast. Available evidence suggests that Malta retained sufficient operational headroom in the en-route charging zone to accommodate the traffic increase without deterioration in the annual KPI.*

The average delay was 0.05 minutes per flight during Summer 2025 - 73% of the delays were due to the reason Other, 18% due to ATC Capacity and 9% due to the reason Weather."

Regarding the description of the adjustments to the capacity plan included in adopted performance plan, the NSA reports: *"No material adjustment to the adopted 2025 capacity planning assumptions is proposed. The annual KPI result indicates that the adopted en-route capacity target remained appropriate for 2025. The NSA will continue monitoring traffic growth, peak-throughput indicators and ATCO planning during RP4 in order to verify whether future adjustments become necessary."*

Regarding the identification and analysis by the NSA of the underlying reasons or circumstances having led to the performance target not being achieved, the NSA reports: *"Not applicable."*

Regarding recommendations to the ANSP to rectify the situation, the NSA reports: *"Not applicable."*

Regarding remedial measures that have been / will be taken by the ANSP to rectify the situation, the NSA reports: *"No additional remedial measures are proposed for 2025 in respect of the en-route capacity KPI, as the annual target was achieved. Routine follow-up will continue through monitoring of slot adherence, throughput, staffing and training data, and the implementation status of planned investment measures relevant to capacity resilience."*

Regarding follow up of the remedial measures indicated in the previous monitoring report(s), the NSA reports: *"Not applicable."*

En route capacity incentive scheme

The en route capacity incentive scheme described in the Malta performance plan does not foresee any possibility of a bonus. Therefore, even though MATS surpassed the required level of en route capacity performance, no financial bonus is applicable.

4.2.2 En route performance indicators at ACC level (PI#4-5)





Focus en route performance indicators at ACC level

Percentage of total en route ATFM delay that occurred on days when the daily throughput was above the expected daily traffic

As background information on actual performance, the NSA reports: *"For Malta ACC, 93.1% of total en-route ATFM delay in 2025 occurred on days when throughput was above expected daily traffic, and the annual weighted average of daily peak throughput was 33.5. These indicators are consistent with a traffic pattern where operational pressure is concentrated in peak periods rather than driven by persistent structural capacity shortage throughout the year. The NSA will continue to monitor whether peak concentration increases in future years and whether additional resilience measures become necessary."*

Annual weighted average of the daily peak throughput

As background information on actual performance, the NSA reports: *"For Malta ACC, 93.1% of total en-route ATFM delay in 2025 occurred on days when throughput was above expected daily traffic, and the annual weighted average of daily peak throughput was 33.5. These indicators are consistent with a traffic pattern where operational pressure is concentrated in peak periods rather than driven by persistent structural capacity shortage throughout the year. The NSA will continue to monitor whether peak concentration increases in future years and whether additional resilience measures become necessary."*

4.2.3 Other en route information



Focus on other en route information

As additional comments to ATCOs in the scope of the performance scheme, the NSA reports: *"As ATCOs are rated for more than one zone, the total of FTE's reported here does not equate the the actual total number of ATCOs reported in section 2 below at year end."*

"See comment for section 1 above."

Regarding the training process, including details on the effective failure rate and the process used to allocate newly qualified ATCOs between ACC, APP and TWR positions, the NSA reports: *"Air Traffic Control Officers (ATCOs) undergo their rating training at GATE Aviation Academy. Each rating course comprises both theoretical instruction and practical simulation training, with trainees being formally assessed throughout all modules to ensure they meet the required competency standards as per Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/340.*

Upon successful completion of the rating course, trainees return to Malta to undertake the Pre-On-the-Job Training (Pre-OJT) programme. Following successful completion of this phase, they commence On-the-Job Training (OJT) in accordance with the provisions of the Unit Training Plan.

In the last decade, there have been four failures during rating training courses: two at the Area Control Surveillance (ACS) stage and two at the Aerodrome Control (ADC) stage.

ATCOs are initially assigned to the Aerodrome Control (ADC) rating. After approximately three years of operational experience, they are expected to progress to the Approach Control Surveillance (APS) rating, followed by the Area Control Surveillance (ACS) rating after a further two years. ATCOs are required to maintain all ratings valid and current until the age of 57."

4.3 Terminal performance

4.3.1 Arrival ATFM delay (KPI#2)





Focus on arrival ATFM delay

Arrival ATFM delay

Average ATFM arrival delay in Malta was 0.18 min/arr in 2025, the first year of RP4. The performance has worsened compared to 2024, last year of RP3, when there was no ATFM arrival delay (0.0 min/arr).

The average for RP4 airports subject to monitoring of ATFM Arrival delay across Member States in 2025 was 0.97 min/arr.

Regarding the reasons and circumstances resulting in the achieved level of actual performance of the arrival ATFM delay per flight KPI, the NSA reports: *"The 2025 terminal and airport ANS ATFM arrival delay per flight KPI was not achieved.*

The actual value at national level (and at LMML) was 0.18 minutes compared with a performance plan target of 0.01 minutes.

Traffic at LMML in 2025 exceeded the forecast used in the performance plan and this increased operational pressure in terminal operations. The 10% increase in LMML traffic resulted in the introduction of flow measures for LMML arrivals from June 2025 onwards.

The NSA notes, that the observed delay level remains limited in absolute terms and should be assessed together with local operating conditions, airport operational factors and wider network impacts affecting arrival sequencing and terminal demand peaks."

Regarding the identification and analysis by the NSA of the underlying reasons or circumstances having led to the performance target not being achieved, the NSA reports: *"The target shortfall is primarily attributable to traffic levels above forecast and the resulting increase in terminal operational complexity. Additional contributing factors include local peak concentration effects and network-related interactions affecting arrival demand and sequencing. The NSA will seek confirmation from the relevant service providers and airport actors to ensure that the root-cause analysis fully reflects the observed 2025 operating conditions."*

Regarding recommendations to the ANSP to rectify the situation, the NSA reports: *"The NSA recommends that the relevant provider(s) review the 2025 drivers of terminal ATFM arrival delay, with particular attention to peak-demand periods, staffing resilience, coordination with airport stakeholders and any opportunities for tactical or structural optimisation of terminal sequencing and arrival management.*

The analysis should also consider whether any local capacity planning assumptions for the remaining RP4 years require refinement in light of higher traffic."

Regarding remedial measures that have been / will be taken by the ANSP to rectify the situation, the NSA reports: *"For the purpose of this draft AMR, no quantified remedial package is proposed pending the completion of the detailed 2025 root-cause review by the relevant operational stakeholders.*

The NSA will monitor the effectiveness of any measures through the 2026 annual cycle, using the arrival delay KPI, remote airport slot-adherence results that affect departures/arrival in Malta, traffic development and any additional local capacity monitoring information made available."

Terminal capacity incentive scheme

The PRB has not been able to assess the results of the ATFM Arrival incentive scheme due to limitations in the target/pivot values information available.

4.3.2 Other terminal performance indicators (PI#1-3)

Airport level										
	Avg arrival ATFM delay (KPI#2)					Slot adherence (PI#1)				
Airport name	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Malta/Luqa	0.18	NA	NA	NA	NA	95.3%	NA	NA	NA	NA

Focus on other terminal performance indicators

ATFM slot adherence

ATFM slot adherence in 2025 was equal to 95.3%, very close to 2024 value – last year of RP3 – of 96.0%. With regard to the 4.8% of flights that did not adhere, 2.8% were early and 2.0% were late.

The average for RP4 airports subject to monitoring of ATFM slot adherence across Member States in 2025 was 96.3%.

As background information on actual performance, the NSA reports: *"Adherence to ATFM slots at LMML was 95.28% in 2025. This indicates generally good operational compliance with ATFM regulations and supports the view that, notwithstanding the miss on the terminal arrival delay KPI, the local operational system continued to function with a satisfactory level of tactical discipline. The NSA will continue to monitor slot-adherence together with terminal delay and peak-traffic indicators to identify whether any deterioration emerges as traffic increases further during RP4."*

ATC pre-departure delay

Malta airport is not subject to the monitoring of this indicator.

All causes pre-departure delay

Malta airport is not subject to the monitoring of this indicator.

5 COST-EFFICIENCY - MALTA

5.1 PRB monitoring

- The en route 2025 actual unit cost of Malta was 14.96€2022, -15.0% lower than the determined unit cost (17.61€2022). The terminal 2025 actual unit cost was 126.68€2022,

-10.8% lower than the determined unit cost (142.05€2022).

- The en route 2025 actual service units (1.3M) were +10.5% higher than the determined service units (1.2M).
- The en route 2025 actual total costs were -1.2M€2022 (-6.1%) lower than determined. This is mainly due to lower staff costs (-0.9M€2022, or -7.5%) and other operating costs (-0.7M€2022, or -26.8%) for MATS. According to the NSA, staff costs decreased mainly due to retirements exceeding plan and a delay in recruitment, while the reduction in other operating costs was mainly due to lower insurance costs.
- MATS spent 3.0M€2022 in 2025 related to costs of investments for both en route and terminal charging zones, +4.6% more than determined (2.8M€2022). According to the NSA, this increase is due greater investments in assets subject to higher depreciation than planned.
- The en route actual unit cost incurred by users in 2025 was 17.48€ (-8.1% below the 2025 DUC), while the terminal actual unit cost incurred by users was 88.29€ (-42.6% below the 2025 DUC). The difference between the AUCU and the DUC for the en route charging zone is mainly driven by traffic risk sharing adjustments. The difference between the AUCU and the DUC for the terminal charging zone is mainly driven by new and existing investments in cost exempt from cost sharing.
- The en route regulatory result for MATS amounted to +3.7M€, or 18.5% of the 2025 revenue. This may indicate that the airspace users are charged for costs which have not materialised in 2025.

5.2 En route charging zone

5.2.1 Unit cost (KPI#1)





Actual and determined data					
Total costs - nominal (M€)	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**
Determined costs	22.1	22.6	26.2	28.8	33.3
Actual costs	20.7	NA	NA	NA	NA
Difference costs	-1.4	NA	NA	NA	NA

Inflation assumptions	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**
Determined inflation rate	2.1%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%
Determined inflation index*	110.9	113.2	115.4	117.7	120.1
Actual inflation rate	2.4%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Actual inflation index*	110.7	NA	NA	NA	NA
Difference inflation index (p.p.)	-0.2	NA	NA	NA	NA

*100 = 2022





Focus on unit cost

AUC vs. DUC

In 2025, the en route AUC was -15.0% (or -2.65 €2022) lower than the planned DUC. This results from the combination of significantly higher than planned TSUs (+10.5%) and significantly lower than planned en route costs in real terms (-6.1%, or -1.2 M€2022).

En route service units

The difference between actual and planned TSUs (+10.5%) falls outside the ±10% threshold foreseen in the traffic risk sharing mechanism. The resulting gain of additional en route revenues is therefore shared between the ANSP and the airspace users (see the main ANSP regulatory result).

En route costs by entity

Actual real en route costs are -6.1% (-1.2 M€2022) lower than planned. This is the result of lower costs for the main ANSP, MATS (-6.1%, or -1.0 M€2022), the NSA/EUROCONTROL (-6.8%, or -0.2 M€2022) and the MET service providers (-3.7%, or -0.03 M€2022).

En route costs for the main ANSP (MATS) at charging zone level

Based on the additional information to the en route reporting tables, the significantly lower than planned en route costs in real terms for MATS in 2025 (-6.1%, or -1.0 M€2022) result from:

- Significantly lower than planned staff costs (-7.5%), mainly due to higher than planned retirements and delays in the implementation of the 2025 recruitment plan.
- Significantly lower than planned other operating costs (-26.8%), mainly due to lower than planned aviation insurance costs and other services.
- Significantly higher than planned depreciation (+10.6%), mainly due to higher than planned asset investments generating higher depreciation costs than forecasted.
- Significantly higher than planned cost of capital (+40.4%), mainly due to a higher than expected asset base in 2025.

Assessment of the actual performance in the charging zone reported by the NSA

The NSA of Malta provides the following overall assessment of the actual performance in 2025 at charging zone level:

"The 2025 en-route cost-efficiency outturn is favourable. Based on the reporting tables reviewed by the NSA, total actual costs for the Malta en-route charging zone were materially below the determined cost base for 2025. The main drivers were lower staff costs and lower other operating costs, partly offset by higher depreciation and higher cost of capital. Actual en-route service units were significantly above forecast, which is also relevant for the evolution of unit cost and the treatment of traffic-related adjustments under the charging scheme."

Explanation of the differences between actual and determined costs at charging zone level reported by the NSA

The NSA provides the following explanation for the differences between actual and determined costs in the charging zone:

"For 2025, total actual en-route costs amounted to EUR 19.119 million compared with determined costs of EUR 22.134 million, i.e. EUR 3.015 million below plan. Within this total, MATS actual costs were EUR 1.228 million below determined costs, mainly due to lower staff costs (higher retirements and delayed recruitment) and lower other operating costs, partly offset by higher depreciation and cost of capital. MET actual costs were slightly below determined costs overall. NSA costs were also materially below determined costs relative to the performance plan assumptions. Actual service units were 1,286.235 thousand compared with 1,163.668 thousand forecast (+10.5%)."

[It should be noted that some of the amounts indicated by the NSA in the analysis cited above differ from the amounts reported in the respective data tables in the same NSA Monitoring Report and in the submission of en route reporting tables (both of which are aligned).]

Recommendations formulated by the NSA to the ANSP (MATS) to rectify the situation and actions taken by the ANSP

The NSA 2025 monitoring report indicates the following recommendations formulated by the NSA:

"The NSA does not consider immediate corrective action necessary in relation to the 2025 en-route outturn, as the overall variance is favourable for users and the provider's narrative is consistent with the reporting tables. The NSA will nevertheless continue to monitor recruitment delivery, execution of investment plans and the risk of deferred expenditure materialising in later RP4 years, particularly in relation to major ATM and infrastructure projects."

5.2.2 Actual unit cost incurred by the users (AUCU) (PI#1)



AUCU components (€/SU) – 2025	
Components of the AUCU in 2025	**€/SU**
DUC	**19.02**
Inflation adjustment	-0.02
Cost exempt from cost sharing	0.28
Traffic risk sharing adjustment	-0.88
Traffic adjustment (costs not TRS)	-0.29
Financial incentives	0.00
Modulation of charges	0.00
Cross-financing	0.00
Other revenues	-0.62
Application of lower unit rate	0.00
Total adjustments	-1.54
AUCU	**17.48**
AUCU vs. DUC	**-8.1%**



Cost exempt from cost sharing – 2025		
Cost exempt from cost sharing by item - 2025	**€'000**	**€/SU**
New and existing investments	544.3	0.42
Competent authorities and qualified entities costs	-172.1	-0.13
Eurocontrol costs	-9.4	-0.01
Pension costs	0.0	0.00
Interest on loans	0.0	0.00
Changes in law	0.0	0.00
Total cost exempt from cost risk sharing	**362.8**	**0.28**

Focus on AUCU

En route AUCU monitoring at charging zone level

The actual en route unit cost incurred by airspace users (AUCU) in respect of activities performed in 2025 (17.48 €) is -8.1% lower than the nominal DUC (19.02 €). The difference between these two figures (-1.54 €/SU) is due to:

- the negative inflation adjustment resulting from lower than planned inflation (-0.02 €/SU);
- the impact of adjustments resulting from the costs exempted from cost sharing mechanism (+0.28 €/SU);
- the deduction of the traffic risk sharing adjustments (-0.88 €/SU);
- the deduction of the traffic adjustment (-0.29 €/SU) for the costs not subject to traffic risk sharing; and,
- the deduction of other revenues (-0.62 €/SU).

The share of the regulatory result (see next sub-section) in the AUCU (before the deduction of other revenues) is 16.1%.

Costs exempt from cost sharing for 2025 presented here are based on preliminary figures and remain subject to revision pending the receipt of the NSA Report on the verification of cost sharing. Any changes may affect the analysis of Actual Costs for Users and the Regulatory Results.

Initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI reported by the NSA

The NSA of Malta provides the following information regarding the initiatives:

"The favourable 2025 en-route actual unit cost incurred by users is supported by (i) actual costs below the determined cost base and (ii) actual service units above forecast. To support sustainable performance over RP4, the main initiatives remain the disciplined implementation of the RP4 investment programme, timely recruitment and training, and continued operational coordination with network partners. The NSA will monitor effectiveness through annual review of actual costs, service units, unit rates and the traffic- and inflation-related adjustments applied under the charging scheme."

5.2.3 Regulatory result (RR)



Focus on regulatory result

MATS net gain/loss on activity in the Malta en route charging zone in 2025

MATS reported a net gain of +2.6 M€, as a combination of a gain of +1.7 M€ arising from the cost sharing mechanism, with a gain of +0.8 M€ arising from the traffic risk sharing mechanism.

MATS overall regulatory result (RR) for the en route activity

Ex-post, the overall RR, taking into account the net gain from the en route activity mentioned above (+2.6 M€) and the actual RoE (+1.1 M€), amounts to +3.7 M€ (18.5% of the en route revenues). The resulting ex-post rate of return on equity is 16.8%, which is higher than the 5.1% planned in the PP.

5.3 Terminal charging zone

5.3.1 Unit cost (KPI#1)





Actual and determined data					
Total costs - nominal (M€)	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**
Determined costs	6.9	8.2	9.5	10.0	10.8
Actual costs	6.5	NA	NA	NA	NA
Difference costs	-0.4	NA	NA	NA	NA

Inflation assumptions	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**
Determined inflation rate	2.1%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%
Determined inflation index*	110.9	113.2	115.4	117.7	120.1
Actual inflation rate	2.4%	NA	NA	NA	NA
Actual inflation index*	110.7	NA	NA	NA	NA
Difference inflation index (p.p.)	-0.2	NA	NA	NA	NA

*100 = 2022





Focus on unit cost

AUC vs. DUC

In 2025, the terminal AUC was -10.8% (or -15.37 €2022) lower than the planned DUC. This results from the combination of significantly higher than planned TNSUs (+5.9%) and significantly lower than planned terminal costs in real terms (-5.6%, or -0.4 M€2022).

Terminal service units

The difference between actual and planned TNSUs (+5.9%) falls outside the ±2% dead-band, but does not exceed the ±10% threshold foreseen in the traffic risk sharing mechanism. The resulting gain of additional terminal revenues is therefore shared between the ANSP and the airspace users (see the main ANSP regulatory result).

Terminal costs by entity

Actual real terminal costs are -5.6% (-0.4 M€2022) lower than planned. This is the result of lower costs for the main ANSP, MATS (-6.3%, or -0.3 M€2022), the NSA (-9.2%, or -0.04 M€2022) and the MET service provider (-3.9%, or -0.01 M€2022) and slightly higher costs for the other ANSP (Malta International Airport (MIA), +0.9%, or +0.01 M€2022).

Terminal costs for the main ANSP (MATS) at charging zone level

Based on the additional information to the terminal reporting tables, the significantly lower than planned terminal costs in real terms for MATS in 2025 (-6.3%, or -0.3 M€2022) result from:

- Lower than planned staff costs (-2.6%), mainly due to actual retirements higher than planned and delays in the implementation of the 2025 recruitment plan.
- Significantly lower than planned other operating costs (-39.7%), mainly due to lower than planned utilities and other essential service costs.
- Significantly higher than planned depreciation (+29.0%), mainly due to higher than planned asset investments generating higher depreciation costs than forecasted.
- Significantly lower than planned cost of capital (-40.3%), mainly due to lower than expected asset base in 2025.

Assessment of the actual performance in the charging zone reported by the NSA

The NSA of Malta provides the following overall assessment of the actual performance in 2025 at charging zone level:

"The 2025 terminal cost-efficiency outturn is favourable overall. Total actual costs for the Malta terminal charging zone were below the determined cost base. Actual terminal service units also exceeded forecast, which is relevant for the actual unit cost incurred by users and for the traffic-related adjustments under the charging scheme."

Explanation of the differences between actual and determined costs at charging zone level reported by the NSA

The NSA provides the following explanation for the differences between actual and determined costs in the charging zone:

"For 2025, total actual terminal costs amounted to EUR 6.113 million compared with determined costs of EUR 6.905 million, i.e. EUR 0.792 million below plan. MATS actual terminal costs were EUR 0.348 million below determined costs, with lower staff and other operating costs offsetting higher depreciation and lower cost of capital. MIA costs were broadly in line with plan with a small net increase, while MET costs were slightly below determined costs. Actual terminal service units were 47.553 thousand compared with 44.901 thousand forecast (+5.9%)."

[It should be noted that some of the amounts indicated by the NSA in the analysis cited above differ from the amounts reported in the respective data tables in the same NSA Monitoring Report and in the submission of terminal reporting tables (both of which are aligned).]

Recommendations formulated by the NSA to the ANSP (MATS) to rectify the situation and actions taken by the ANSP

The NSA 2025 monitoring report indicates the following recommendations formulated by the NSA:

"The NSA recommends that MATS continues to monitor staff planning, cost allocation discipline and the timing of investments. In this respect the NSA recommends that MATS brings its investment pipeline back on schedule as per PP, ensures that recruitment of new ATCO meets the plans in the PP such that the planned expenditure is effected as proposed in the PP and does not show excessive ambition in the PP such that Airspace Users are overcharged."

No information was provided by MATS in the NSA 2025 Monitoring Report.

5.3.2 Actual unit cost incurred by the users (AUCU) (PI#1)



AUCU components (€/SU) – 2025	
Components of the AUCU in 2025	**€/SU**
DUC	**153.77**
Inflation adjustment	-0.19
Cost exempt from cost sharing	-55.40
Traffic risk sharing adjustment	-3.60
Traffic adjustment (costs not TRS)	-0.80
Financial incentives	0.00
Modulation of charges	0.00
Cross-financing	0.00
Other revenues	-5.49
Application of lower unit rate	0.00
Total adjustments	-65.48
AUCU	**88.29**
AUCU vs. DUC	**-42.6%**



Cost exempt from cost sharing – 2025		
Cost exempt from cost sharing by item - 2025	**€'000**	**€/SU**
New and existing investments	-2,589.7	-54.46
Competent authorities and qualified entities costs	-44.7	-0.94
Eurocontrol costs	0.0	0.00
Pension costs	0.0	0.00
Interest on loans	0.0	0.00
Changes in law	0.0	0.00
Total cost exempt from cost risk sharing	**-2,634.4**	**-55.40**

Focus on AUCU

Terminal AUCU monitoring at charging zone level

The actual terminal unit cost incurred by airspace users (AUCU) in respect of activities performed in 2025 (88.29 €) is -42.6% lower than the nominal DUC (153.77 €). The difference between these two figures (-65.48 €/SU) is due to:

- the negative inflation adjustment resulting from lower than planned inflation (-0.19 €/SU);
- the impact of adjustments resulting from the costs exempted from cost sharing mechanism (-55.40 €/SU);
- the deduction of the traffic risk sharing adjustments (-3.60 €/SU);
- the deduction of the traffic adjustment (-0.80 €/SU) for the costs not subject to traffic risk sharing; and,
- the deduction of other revenues (-5.49 €/SU).

The share of the regulatory result (see next sub-section) in the AUCU (before the deduction of other revenues) is -40.2%.

Costs exempt from cost sharing for 2025 presented here are based on preliminary figures and remain subject to revision pending the receipt of the NSA Reports on the verification of cost sharing. Any changes may affect the analysis of Actual Costs for Users and the Regulatory Results.

Initiatives implemented or planned that will improve this PI reported by the NSA

The NSA of Malta provides the following information regarding the initiatives:

"The favourable 2025 terminal actual unit cost incurred by users is primarily explained by actual costs below the determined cost base combined with terminal service units above forecast. For the remaining RP4 years, the focus should remain on cost discipline, accurate cost allocation, investment delivery and operational resilience as traffic develops. The NSA will monitor the effectiveness of these measures through the annual review of actual costs, service units, traffic-related adjustments and any emerging terminal capacity pressures."

5.3.3 Regulatory result (RR)



Focus on regulatory result

MATS net gain/loss on activity in the Malta terminal charging zone in 2025

MATS reported a net loss of -2.1 M€, as a combination of a loss of -2.3 M€ arising from the cost sharing mechanism, with a gain of +0.2 M€ arising from the traffic risk sharing mechanism.

MATS overall regulatory result (RR) for the terminal activity

Ex-post, the overall RR, taking into account the net loss from the terminal activity mentioned above (-2.1 M€) and the actual RoE (+0.2 M€), amounts to -1.8 M€ (-61.6% of the terminal revenues). The resulting ex-post rate of return on equity is negative (-41.1%) compared to the 5.1% planned in the PP.